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consider Europe as a friend. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Again a tussle with Europe (oh, it's not a war yet: they say that we – Russia, that 
is—are still a long way from war)... and again in Europe they are looking 
mistrustfully at Russia. Yet why should we go running to seek Europe's trust? 
Did Europe ever trust the Russians? Can she ever trust us and stop seeing us as 
her enemy? Oh, of course this view will change someday; someday Europe will 
better be able to make us out and realize what we are like... (Dostoevsky, 1873-
1876/1997, 515). 
It is hard to believe that Dostoevsky wrote this passage in “Writer's Diary” almost 150 
years ago. A reader will most likely agree that every word remains topical nowadays 
and as such, it may be easily applied to the description of the current relations between 
Russia and Europe. The word “tussle” is especially notable because it seems to be the 
usual state of Russian-European relations. It is worth referring here to the Cold War 
period, which was “not a war yet”, but rather a “tussle”. Generally, “tussle” 
characterized relations between Europe and the USSR throughout the whole 20th 
century. 
If we consider the current situation, we will also see that “the day”, which Dostoevsky 
refers to, has not come yet. In recent years, relations between Russia and the EU block 
have faced hard times due to a variety of reasons. These reasons include the general 
deterioration of the world economy and the financial crisis, the deployment of the anti-
ballistic missile system in Europe and the NATO expansion right up to the Russian 
borders and the supposed violations of human rights by the Russian government. 
Certainly, this deterioration in Russian-European relations could not have been 
neglected in the Russian mass media.  
However, we may assume that, as relations between Russia and its European partners 
cannot be reduced to the “positive-negative” dichotomy, the representations of those 
relations portrayed in the Russia mass media are also likely to be much more complex 
than it may seem at first sight. That is why the aim of this research is to examine the 
representations of Russian-European relations in the articles covering the Pussy Riot 
case in four Russian newspapers: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Kommersant, Vedomosti, and 
6 
 
Izvestia. As such, the research question is: how are relations between Europe and 
Russia represented in the articles covering the Pussy Riot case and in the context of 
Russian political culture and the discourses of different Russian political forces?  
Let me note that there are many different opinions on what Europe is and what countries 
it includes. Because the discussion of these opinions is not the point of the research, by 
Europe I am referring primarily to the member states of the European Union (EU). I 
realize that this approach might be somewhat simplified because the relations between 
Russia and different members of the EU vary significantly due to historic, political, and 
economic reasons. Thus, covering all of the specific aspects of Russian relations with 
separate European states would definitely be of interest, but it is too broad for one 
study.  
I have chosen to study press rather than any other means of mass communication. This 
is despite the fact that press does not attract as broad audience in Russia as, for example, 
radio or TV. There are two main reasons for this decision. Firstly, the press seems to 
exercise a little bit more freedom than other media types. This idea, for instance, finds 
support in an article written by a well-known Russian journalist Vladimir Pozner (2011, 
January 24). So, the press may provide this study with more diverse views than state 
controlled television because it is more likely to reflect not only the official 
representations, but be influenced by the discourse of other political forces bedsides the 
dominant one. The second reason for using the press is connected to some practical 
issues: at the Master’s level, it is almost impossible to transcribe the amount of TV 
programs needed for the research and to get access to the records of the programs.  
I will study the coverage of the Pussy Riot case in four newspapers: Izvestia, 
Kommersant, Rossiyskaya gazeta, and Vedomosti. Izvestia was chosen because it has 
the largest circulation among the quality newspapers; Rossiyskaya gazeta is published 
by the Russian government and its publications have an explicit pro-government 
orientation. Finally, Vedomosti and Kommersant are liberal quality business newspapers 
which generally express pro-western ideas. Thus, the selected newspapers are supposed 
to satisfy the demands of diverse audiences and as such, they are more likely to paint a 
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very different picture of Russia’s relations with Europe. This diversity has helped to 
achieve the purpose of the study and to collect rich and versatile data.  
It has been decided to analyze articles covering Russian-European relations in the 
articles covering the Pussy Riot case. This angle seems suitable because the case has 
provoked broad public and political discussion and has demonstrated some fundamental 
differences in perceptions and cultures within Russia and in the European countries. The 
Punk band Pussy Riot held a performance called the “Punk-prayer: ‘Holy Mother of 
God, Cast Putin Out!’” in the Cathedral of the Redeemer in Moscow on February 21, 
2012. By March 16 three members of the band, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Mariya 
Alekhina, and Ekaterina Smutsevich were arrested on a charge of hooliganism 
committed because of religious hatred and animosity and in August they were sentenced 
to two years in prison. The Pussy Riot case has turned out to be one of the most 
scandalous processes in Russia in recent years and it has been followed carefully inside 
and outside the country. 
The research consists of four chapters apart from the introduction. Thus, the second 
chapter is a literature review that outlines the major theoretical concepts applied in the 
research. The chapter also gives some historical and political background for a reader 
that is not well versed in Russian studies. The research is conducted within the 
theoretical frames of media discourse and international relations. The first part of the 
chapter uncovers the notions of discourse, media discourse, and representations. In the 
research the term “discourse” primarily means a particular way of representing a social 
practice. The second part examines the historical context of Russian-European relations, 
as well as provides information on the political discourses connected to these relations 
as articulated by Russian political force. It also examines the attributes of Russian 
political culture. In brief, the theoretical background is based on an idea that media 
discourse on Russian-European relations is shaped by the discourses of different 
political forces, as well as by a national political culture. Thus, representations of 
Russian-European relations in the press work as a bridge between political culture and 
the discourses of political parties and blocks.  
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The third chapter uncovers the principles of the research method. In order to answer the 
research question, I have applied critical discourse analysis (CDA) to retrieve and 
examine representations of Russian-European relations. In accordance with the CDA 
model offered by Fairclough (2001), the analysis has been carried out on three levels: 
linguistic, intertextual, and the macro level of social structures. Due to the wide range of 
texts, it has been decided to concentrate primarily on intertextual analysis. Also, 
linguistic analysis has been used as a supplementary tool when it was relevant and 
helpful. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the description of the results.  
The fifth chapter synthesizes the results of the research with the concepts discussed in 
the literature review. To be more concrete, it builds the retrieved representations into the 
framework of social practices. This process is the macro-level part of a CDA. In this 
chapter, I have tried to explain why mass media represent Russian-European relations in 
the particular ways that it does. Specifically, I examine what influences Russian-
European relations and where the representations are derived from. Finally, this chapter 
delineates the implications of the research, its significance and limitations.   
The analysis of how the Russian press represents the EU countries and their relations 
with Russia is a relevant topic because it provides an opportunity to understand the 
notion of the world that is transmitted by mass media to an average Russian person. 
What is more, Russian diplomats and politicians dealing with the EU are constrained by 
national interests and international courtesies. Thus, I conjecture that they may have 
some latent implications while describing the attitudes of the Russian government 
towards Europe because their opinions are not openly stated. Meanwhile, the 
representations of Russian-European relations in the media directed at Russian citizens 
may provide clearer information that might otherwise be omitted in official diplomatic 
speeches and documents. Moreover, the analysis of the representations gives the reader 
some understanding of what aspects of Russian-European relations are taken for granted 
by Russian journalists as common sense knowledge and thus is conveyed to audiences 
as an unchallenged fact. The results of the research could be useful both inside and 
outside of Russia because they provide the reader with a better idea of the Russian 
government’s position on Russian-European relations and reveal some of the latent 
implications and intentions that they have with regards to international affairs. The 
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research also reveals some of the ways that Russian citizens perceive Russian-European 
relations. 
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CHAPTER 2: AT THE CROSSROADS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE AND 
INTERNATINAL RELATIONS  
As the goal of the research is to reveal and analyze the representations of the relations 
between Russia and its European partners in four Russian newspapers, it is easy to 
notice that the study unfolds at the crossroads of two academic fields: media and 
communications studies and international relations theory. As a result, in order to 
achieve the goal of the study, I have to provide theoretical background from both of the 
fields. Thus this chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first one concentrates 
on the notion of discourse in general, and media discourse in particular. The second 
chapter describes some of the unique aspects of Russian-European relations and 
examines those relations in a historic context.  
  
2.1 Discourse theory 
My research is built upon the concept of discourse. Discourse theory is exceptionally 
complex and has a variety of different approaches, including for example critical 
discourse analysis and poststructuralist analysis. Hence, the notion of discourse itself 
has a wide range of meanings and implications depending of which approach we 
choose. That is why I have to start by specifying the concept and providing an 
explanation of some other notions which are widely used in discourse theory. I will 
begin by explaining why discourse is one of the key concepts in my research. Then, I 
will move on to describe my understanding of discourse in general, media discourse and 
representations in particular.  
 
2.1.1. Discourse and reality 
Norman Fairclough (2001), whom I primarily rely on regarding discourse and critical 
discourse analysis, writes that discourse may function in three different ways. The first 
one is when discourse works “as a part of the social activity within a practice” 
(Fairclough, 2001, 2). He gives an example of a shop assistant who uses a certain type 
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of language in a particular way. In my view, this application of the word discourse may 
be quite often substituted by the word “genre”. Johnstone (2001, 2) defines this 
approach more concretely by saying that when one puts emphasis on a linguistic sense 
of the notion, discourse means “actual instances of communication in the medium of 
language.” The second way the term discourse may function, according to Fairclough 
(2001, 2), is when it serves as one of the elements of constructing identities: for 
example, “the identity of a political leader such as Tony Blair in the UK is partly a 
semiotically constituted way of being.”   
The third way that it is used - which is specifically important for my research - is when 
discourse functions as representations. Fairclough (2001, 2) explains: “Social actors 
within any practice produce representations of other practices, as well as (reflexive) 
representations of their own practice, in the course of their activity within the practice.” 
Thus, “representation is a process of social construction of practices, including reflexive 
self-construction - representations enter and shape social processes and practices” 
(Fairclough, 2001, 2). Hence, when I refer to media representations of Russian-
European relations, it can be interpreted as a reference to the representations of the 
practices that are applied and exploited by the Russian and European politicians and 
diplomats when they are engaged in the process of international relations. It should be 
made clear that these representations are also produced and interpreted by journalists 
and other authors of media articles. In this sense, the word discourse may be used in its 
plural form: “For instance, the lives of poor and disadvantaged people are represented 
through different discourses in the social practices of government, politics, medicine, 
and social science, and through different discourses within each of these practices 
corresponding to different positions of social actors” (Fairclough, 2001, 2). 
 It needs to be highlighted that throughout my research I generally use the term 
“discourse” as described in the third meaning outlined above. At this point it should be 
clear that the term “representation” stated in the goal of the study is connected to the 
meaning of the word “discourse” as a representation of a social practice.  
It may be hard to discern and fully grasp connections between discourses, language in 
general, and reality. It is more or less clear what effect reality has on language, but the 
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reverse effects are not so obvious. Hall (1993, 96) explains it in the following way: 
“Reality exists outside language but it is constantly mediated by and through language; 
and what we can know and say has to be produced through discourse.” However, 
discourse is not reduced to conveying pre-existing meanings: it plays an important role 
in constructing those meanings as well. As a result, while reality exists outside people’s 
minds, it can be learnt and applied by people in the form of languages, myths, and 
ideologies in order to produce experiences in the context of day-to-day life. Purvis and 
Hunt (1993, 474) also add that while “this consciousness is borne through language and 
other systems of signs, it is transmitted between people and institutions”, but also “the 
way in which people comprehend and make sense of the social world has consequences 
for the direction and character of their action and inaction.” Thus, discourse changes not 
only the way people see and perceive the world, but also consequently, how they 
behave. Thereby, we could not describe discourse as just a bridge connecting language 
and social experiences or mental and material realms because the “bridge” itself in 
return has the ability to influence and construct these realms. 
As it has already been said, discourse is not universal and we can find discourses 
referring to different spheres of knowledge and various aspects of our lives. Fairclough 
(2001) even acknowledges that there may be many discourses referring to the same field 
by saying that some orders of discourse turn out to be more common and dominant and 
even transformed into common sense beliefs. These “hegemonic” discourses are always 
challenged by the marginal ones, making up an open and interacting system of 
discourses. With the rapidly changing context, disruptive discourses may cause the 
overall instability of meanings. The result is a situation when people understand the 
same event or object in different ways.  
Having outlined the basic concept of discourse, I want to focus on and dwell upon some 
of the particular aspects of media discourse that are relevant for my study.   
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2.1.2 Media discourse and power 
This sub-chapter delineates a range of discursive concepts that are necessary in order to 
understand the mechanisms of interaction between media and a social environment. 
Particular attention is given to the relation of media discourse and power structures. 
Above all, the sub-chapter formulates why and how studying media discourse may help 
a reader to better comprehend Russian-European relations.  
When people watch TV or read a newspaper, they believe that the main purpose of these 
activities is to acquire news on current events and to understand topical issues. This idea 
constitutes a superficial level of media consumption. More profound consideration 
makes us realize that at the same time a person also gains information about the way the 
world is organized, about common social practices and relationships between subjects. 
In other words, mass media are not merely the means of communicating information, 
but also the means of constructing reality and maintaining a social order. 
This idea has become common knowledge through its description in both fiction and 
scientific literature. If we try to find examples in fiction, we may recollect “newspeak”, 
the official language of Oceania contrived by George Orwell in the well-known novel 
“1984”. He considered “newspeak” to be such a substantial part of the novel that he 
even wrote a separate appendix for it called “The Principles of Newspeak”. In this 
appendix, he mentioned that “the purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a 
medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of 
Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible” (Orwell, 1949/2004, 372). 
This quotation perfectly illustrates the role and connections of discourse, language, and 
social life. 
Having provided an example from fiction, let us move on to scientific sources. A 
starting point here is the fact that, as has been discussed in the previous sub-chapter, 
media discourse is an integral part of social life. As such, the role of discourse may vary 
considerably depending on a particular case. There are various factors determining this 
role, including different kinds of changes and transformations in social practices. Thus, 
the role of media discourse will be different in each particular case and as a result, every 
situation should be analyzed separately (Fairclough, 2001). The role of media discourse, 
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which is particularly important for the research, is that it can serve as a tool for 
exercising power in society.   
Next, all discourses, including media discourses, vary depending on how much power 
they exercise. As it has already been mentioned, certain media discourses may become 
dominant due to a variety of different reasons. Firstly, according to Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989), some “media packages” may be more potent than others as they 
resonate with the views and beliefs that already exist in society or with the traditions 
and myths of a certain culture in general. In the other words, because the way 
information is processed by a recipient is shaped by pre-existing meanings, values, and 
beliefs, the discourses that correlate with those meanings will have more influence on a 
person (Scheufele, 1999). Moreover, Gerbner (1985), looking at this idea from a mass 
media perspective, states that media messages on symbolic or representational events 
are intentionally, though not always consciously, coded in order to connect  the public 
to a feeling of some shared significance surrounding the event. Media discourse 
constructs and interprets a “common symbolic environment” for the way people 
understand, respond and support it (Gerbner, 1985, 13).  
That is one of the reasons why I have decided to bring the concept of political culture 
into my study. Political culture will be described in the following sub-chapters. I have 
chosen a concept of political culture instead of a “common symbolic environment” of 
Russian citizens because the latter one seems to be too broad. At the same time, the 
attributes of Russian political culture constitute at least a part of a “common symbolic 
environment”, but they have been examined in academic literature and are presented as 
a coherent classification (Bova, 2010, 24-25). 
Secondly, some scholars believe that, because mass media are social institutions with 
their own identities, media discourses can be guided by their internal policies (Gerbner, 
1985). It gives Davis (1985, 51) an opportunity to describe news texts as “a form of 
public, institutional discourse constructed according to unusually strict and 
conventionalised procedures.” His main point is that most news texts are extremely 
homogeneous and consistent in the way they portray social issues. It is so not due to the 
conscious biases of certain journalists or means of mass communications, but rather due 
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to “institutional mechanisms which process facts, events and personalities through the 
filter of highly contentious assumptions about such matters as democracy, the causes of 
inflation, the status of speaker’s opinions, or the audience’s capacity to understand” 
(Davis, 1985, 58).  
Thirdly, I have discussed that media discourse is a powerful tool for constructing 
meanings and shaping audiences’ views and attitudes. Moreover, it is possible to 
reproduce or transform a particular social order by producing discourses. As a result, 
official, or governmental institutions, as well as private groups, will always have a 
reason to use discourses pro domo sua. At the same time, a society usually does not 
mind those groups controlling the discourse and sees it as normal because “every 
society takes special steps to assure that authoritative decision-making in the field of 
public-making is reserved to the key establishments of the power structure…” (Gerbner, 
1985, 15). Overall, it means that any power structures always have a reason and an 
opportunity to misuse a media discourse.  
Because there is enough evidence that Russia’s “all-important independent media had 
been brought under Kremlin control” during Putin’s first presidential term, it is 
necessary to draw special attention to the relations between media discourse and 
governmental institutions (Nygren, 2010, 40, see also Lipman, 2010). As a rule, 
governmental services have easier access to and, as a result, more influence on media 
discourse. Journalists covering a topic try not to neglect the official point of view 
because they consider governmental sources to be more objective, reliable and complete 
(Sigal, 1973, in Gamson at al., 1992). Though, quite often journalists do not make a 
special effort to promote official ideas: they use them out of convenience as a routine 
journalistic technique. As a result, Sigal (1973, in Gamson at al., 1992, 376) concludes 
that eventually journalists "are exploited by their sources either to insert information 
into the news or to propagandize." 
However, the connection between official sources and objectivity is definitely not direct 
and obvious all around the world. It is possible to find with many cases where ordinary 
people or a journalist himself may possess even more reliable information than any 
official. Schmid (2004) developed and confirmed this theory while studying the 
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discourse used by the Soviet media to speak about nuclear energy after the Chernobyl 
disaster. Thus, she points out that the discourse was also used as a rhetorical tool “aimed 
at gaining, consolidating, or protecting authority and legitimacy of expertise, as well as 
control over decision-making processes in the energy  sector and, as a result, in policy 
making in general” (Schmid, 2004, 354). 
With regard to the relations between media discourse and governmental institutions, I 
have to describe some peculiarities of Russian journalistic practices by referring to 
Lipman’s article “Rethinking Russia: Freedom of Expression without Freedom of the 
Press.” She writes that “the political regime that Putin built has the appearance of 
having democratic institutions, but they have been radically emasculated” (2010, 161). 
It applies also to media institutions. By this I mean that generally all important mass 
media have to consider how Kremlin may react on this or that report. There is a certain 
level of criticism that is acceptable for a journalist that does not annoy the government, 
and it is important for a media outlet not to cross this level: if journalists “are careful not 
to encroach on powerful interests, reporters working for prominent Moscow publication 
can get away with challenging specific government policies or high-ranking officials” 
Lipman (2010, 161). If a reporter dares cross the allowed boundary, the government 
may use either subtle or brutal ways to deal with a defiant reporter. This indicates that 
for Russia the problem of governmental influence on media discourse is much more 
topical than in the majority of European countries. 
Finally, a discussion on the relationships between media and state would not be 
complete without a brief reference to the correlation between the notions of “discourse”, 
“ideology”, and “propaganda”. Purvis' and Hunt’s (1993) compare the terms “ideology” 
and “discourse” in the article “Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, 
Ideology...” Firstly, they mention that both “ideology and discourse refer to pretty much 
the same aspect of social life - the idea that human individuals participate in forms of 
understanding, comprehension or consciousness of the relations and activities in which 
they are involved” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993, 474). They express the idea that the 
relationship between the concepts is so tight that sometimes they are used 
interchangeably and, while sometimes they are counterposed in academic literature, it 
would be interesting to replace the term “discourse” for “ideology” in some 
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fundamental studies on this topic to see if their essence has somehow changed. To be 
clear, the concepts do not have exactly the same implications because “ideology”, as a 
term, rather depicts the ways “in which people, to paraphrase Marx, become conscious 
of their conflicting interests and struggle over them” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993, 476). 
Ideology puts emphasis on the connection between “interests” and consciousness, while 
“discourse” stresses the connection between social relations and language, or any 
semiotic vehicles (Purvis and Hunt, 1993). 
Additionally, “propaganda” and “discourse” are also easily correlated notions. Of 
course, after the collapse of the Nazi and Soviet Regimes, the concept of propaganda 
does not seem to be attractive to Western scholars, but unfortunately it still remains a 
relevant issue in at least half of the world, including some Western countries. If we 
follow Ó Tuathail (2005, 363-364), who defines propaganda “as works of mass media 
deliberately designed by powerful state institutions to condition popular geopolitical 
attitudes and promote loyalty to the state, particularly the military,” we can conclude 
that propaganda is a certain type of media discourse aimed at reconstructing social order 
and that it can be seen as the ultimate level of governmental influence on society with 
the help of media discourse. 
To sum it up, though media discourse is articulated by mass media, different power 
structures have a huge opportunity to potentially exploit it in order to maintain or 
transform social order depending on their particular needs.  
To conclude this sub-chapter, let me summarize some of its main points. Firstly, the 
notion of discourse has a variety of meanings, but the in this research, to state in briefly, 
it is used as a particular way of representing a social practice. Secondly, media 
discourse can be used and abused by power structures as a tool for exercising power. I 
realize that the discussion of discourse, its forms and roles, is far from being complete, 
but I have tried to cover all aspects needed for the research.   
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2.4 Russian-European relations in Russians’ eyes 
Having explained the concept of discourse, I will now concentrate on the part of my 
research that pertains to international relations theory. Firstly, I will provide a very 
general introduction into the history of orientation debate in Russia. Secondly, I will try 
to delineate a variety of representations of the relations in the discourses of different 
political parties. Thirdly, I will examine some of the attributes of Russian political 
culture that are likely to have influence on the analyzed representations.  
 
2.2.1 Russia-European relations in historical context 
The way the Russian nation perceives Europe and relates to Europe is exceptionally 
complex due to geographical and historical reasons: Russia is situated on the 
intersection of the two continents – Europe and Asia. Generally, the whole Russian 
nation has always been internally divided into those who believe that Russia should 
follow the Western patterns of development and those who are confident that Russia has 
“its own way”. The phrases “its own way/its particular way/Russian way” have even 
turned into a special notion, a symbol, which has certain subtle connotations and 
meanings in geopolitics and for the whole population (Engelbrekt, Nygren, 2010a, 7, 
Nygren, 2010, 55).  
The history of the debates between the adherents of those positions dates back at least to 
the 18
th
 century, namely to the rule of Peter the Great. In the middle of the 19
th
 century, 
Russian intellectuals were split into “Westernizers” (“zapadniki”) who saw the Russian 
Empire as a part of Western civilization and “Slavophiles” who believed that Russia, 
due to its geographical location, neither belonged to the East nor to the West and should 
not strive to join either of them (Engelbrekt, and Nygren, 2010a, Legvold, 2007). In 
order to explain better the nature of those notions, let me refer once again to 
Dostoevsky’s “Writer’s diary”. Dostoevsky (1873-1876/1997, 237) who rather 
belonged to a Slavophile camp, characterized Westernizers as follows:  
Our Westernizers are the people who today are trumpeting at full volume and 
with extraordinary malice and satisfaction that we have neither science nor 
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common sense or patience or ability, that we are destined only to crawl behind 
Europe, slavishly aping her in everything… 
Later on, he explains who, in his opinion, Slavophiles are: they 
tried to make people see that Russia was not Europe but a different creature 
altogether when they pointed out that the Westernizers were equating things that 
were dissimilar and incompatible and when they argued that something true for 
Europe was entirely inapplicable to Russia… (Dostoevsky, 1873-1876/1997, 
519). 
Though, Dostoevsky’s view on Westernizes and Slavophiles is definitely subjective and 
biased, nevertheless it gives a clear idea about the nature of contradiction between those 
movements.  
What is specifically ironic is that in the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the Bolsheviks 
began as Westernizers who tried to implant in Russian people not only the ideas of 
revolution and the importance of the proletariat, but also faith in progress, the repulsion 
of nationalism, and the belief in the common all-European way of development. 
However, within a decade after the Revolution, they turned into “Slavophiles” and 
extreme isolationists (Bayer, 2012, 1 October 1). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the idea of “its own way” lost its credibility for a 
decade because the government was headed by the “westernizers” who “tried to push 
Russian foreign policy and orientation towards cooperation with NATO and the 
European Union” (O'Loughlin, Ó Tuathail, Kolossov, 2005, 329). Smith (1999) clearly 
points out that during this period Russia aimed at becoming closer to the West 
economically by adapting a capitalistic model and by shifting its attitudes towards 
Western ideology: Russia was claimed to be “'returning to civilization', again becoming 
'an apprentice of Europe’” (Smith,1999, 482).   
In the 2000s, pro-Western feelings in Russia have waned due to a variety of internal and 
external reasons: for example, the debt crisis of 2008 (which has formed prejudice 
against the Western liberal economic model even in some developed countries) 
increasing tensions in the relations with some Western leaders, and NATO expansion 
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(Engelbrekt and Nygren, 2010a). Nowadays in the Russia political arena there are 
advocates for both pro-Western development and Russian centric values: pro-Western 
supporters “remain a considerable and influential faction of Russian public opinion - 
about 20%” (O'Loughlin et al., 2005, 330) - and [there is also support] for “alternative” 
development, [from a group]  who “see Russia as a distinctive civilization, different 
from the West in its cultural values and geopolitical security concerns and interests” 
(Smith, 1999, 488). In a certain sense, it means that fundamentally not much has 
changed since the 18
th
 century. 
 
2.2.2 Political discourses on relations with the West 
It must be clear by this point that relations with the West in general and Europe in 
particular have special importance for Russia. Some scholars, including for example 
Prozorov (2010), believe that those relations are much more important than relation 
with other countries because Russia has been building its identity with respect to 
Europe, not China or Japan. This is also true if we take into account the situation of the 
post-USSR period:  
Ironically, the entire Russian political spectrum in the post-communist period 
has been tied to the figure of Europe, be it the early liberal-democratic optimism 
of the ‘Common European Home’, the desire of liberal-conservatives to ‘abduct 
Europe’ by disassociating it from the United States… The wild oscillation of 
positions that nonetheless all refer to Europe as a Big Other, whose recognition 
is necessary for the validation of one’s subjectivity …  (Prozorov, 2010, 89). 
As a result, it seems relevant to describe the contemporary geopolitical discourses of 
modern Russia. After the State Duma simplified the process of party registration in 
2012, dozens of new political organizations appeared. However, very few of them have 
any political influence, and I will concentrate only on the discourses of the most 
prominent parties and blocks.  
Nowadays, the Russian political spectrum can be conditionally divided into three 
sections. The first one is the “United Russia” party. It dominates the Parliament, 
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supports Vladimir Putin and is headed by the current prime-minister Dmitry Medvedev. 
The second block is a “system opposition”, or all the other political parties represented 
in the Parliament. This block cooperates with the “United Russia” party. The third block 
is the so called “non-system”, “non-parliamentary” opposition. These are political 
forces that are strongly opposed to the incumbent government, are generally suppressed 
by the dominating structures and as a result, cannot get into the Parliament (see, for 
example, Golosov, 2011 September 1; Trenin, 2012, March 2; Nichol, 2013, April 16). 
For my research, it is important to mention that the non-system opposition consists of a 
variety of different political movements. Hence, the range of views among its 
representatives varies from radical nationalism to radical liberalism. However, a 
significant part of them seem to have clearly pro-Western orientation and share the 
democratic ideals of European society (Trenin, 2012, March 2). 
 
“United Russia” discourse on Russian-European relations  
I will start with the discourse of “United Russia” and its unofficial leader Vladimir 
Putin. According to O'Loughlin et al. (2005), in the beginning of 2000s, the party had a 
unique double-faced approach towards relations with the West. This meant that it 
exploited elements of “Eurasianism” and a simplified idea of “Russian nationalism” 
“which grew up around authoritarian centralization, imperial expansion and the 
domination of civil society and public life by a coercive state” (O'Loughlin et al., 2005, 
330). However, as Russia was highly dependent on oil sales to the European countries, 
it could not openly express a grudge against Western society. Smith (1999, 488) 
confirms this by saying that though the incumbent government felt “uneasy about 
Atlanticism as a geopolitical project, it is pragmatic enough to recognize that Russia 
must work with the West, and that it is in its interests to cooperate with Western-
dominated international organizations.” Consequently, Russian top officials, including 
Vladimir Putin, had “to wear a Western mask to Western leaders and domestic 
Westernizers (zapadniki), but changing to a 'great power' Russian mask for different 
domestic constituencies” (O'Loughlin et al., 2005, 423). O'Loughlin et al. (2005) also 
say that the pro-Western vector dominated Russian foreign policy for pragmatic, mainly 
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economic reasons, while in terms of ideology, Russia was not much closer to the West 
than the USSR was. 
All this gives sufficient evidence that in the beginning of the 2000s, Russian foreign 
policy discourse was clearly bilateral. As Colton and Hale (2009) say, one the one hand, 
Putin’s rhetoric made it clear that Russia saw itself a as member of the Western 
community, sharing common European views and values; on the other hand, he always 
expressed discontent with the Western internal and international policies and saw the 
West as “an unreliable partner that frequently harbors ill or disrespectful intentions 
regarding Russia and that therefore must constantly be kept in check at the same time 
that cooperation must still be pursued” (Colton and Hale, 2009, 496-497).  
However, there is another way to look at this, namely that pro-Western attitudes in 
Putin’s discourse are either very superficial or may have never existed at all because 
“…Putin and his entourage have consciously and cynically promoted the nationalist, 
xenophobic and isolationist aspects of the Slavophile creed to keep real democracy out” 
(Bayer, 2012, October 1). 
Nevertheless, if one could have doubts about whether Putin’s discourse was pro-
Western or slavophilic in the early 2000s, by the end of the decade it became clear that 
the pro-Western tone has almost disappeared. More and more scholars agree that Putin 
nowadays stresses the threat from the West rather than the need for cooperation (Colton 
and Hale, 2009, Engelbrekt and Nygren, 2010, 8). They assert that Russian foreign 
policy has become much less oriented towards the West and it again accentuates the 
ideas of “power” and “geostrategic thinking”. Hence, “it therefore appears that the 
rhetoric of integration has acquired a life of its own, entirely detached from the actual 
state of Russia-Europe relations” (Prozorov, 2010, 81). In other words, while dealing 
with Europe, Kremlin continues to assert that Russia strives to become a legitimate part 
of it, but at the same time these statements do not correlate with the way Russia acts on 
the international scene. 
We may regard the discourse of “United Russia” and Putin as a hegemonic one. 
However, mass media are likely to reflect the beliefs not only of the centrist Putin’s 
supporters, but also of those who favor other parties. That is why it is worth giving a 
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short overview of the discourses on Russian relations with Europe of the other major 
political forces.  
 
Liberals’ discourse on Russian-European relations  
I will start by mentioning the ideas of liberals and democrats. The liberal government 
came into power in 1991 headed by Egor Gaydar.  Its major aim at this point was to 
liberalize the Russian economy and political system and to move towards a free market. 
From the 1990s through the 2000s, the liberal movement was represented by two major 
parties: “Union of the Right Forces” (SPS), whose views are similar to the right-liberals 
in the European political spectrum, and the Russian United Democratic Party 
“Yabloko”, which is similar in political views to the European left-centrists. Their 
adherents have always had a strong pro-Western orientation: they believe in capitalism, 
democracy and the absolute privilege of human rights and freedoms. 
The influence of liberal ideology on the politics in general and foreign policy in 
particular gradually declined over the course of the 2000s. Nowadays these parties are 
not represented in the parliament. Nevertheless, Bayer (2012, October 1) asserts that 
liberal pro-Western camp has regenerated in recent years because the current political 
regime is quite open, comparing, for example, with the Soviet Union. As people can 
easily get access to the information on how democracy functions in Europe, they are 
likely to call for a similar standard of living and appropriate reforms. Some of the 
adherents and leaders of the liberals have become the prominent figures of the non-
system opposition in recent years.  
 
Discourses on Russian-European relations of other substantial political parties 
Apart from “United Russia”, there are three other political parties represented in the 
State Duma of the current convocation 2011-2016: the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDPR), “Just Russia” (“Spravedlivaya Rossiya”), and Communist Party of the 
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Russian Federation (KPRF). Let me briefly introduce their views on relations with 
Europe. 
Firstly, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, or LDPR, according to Smith (1999), 
belongs to the New Right’s wing. The New Rights oppose Eurasianism both culturally 
and geopolitically, because they see it as a consolidation of the Eastern European forces 
and “Atlanticism” movement headed by the USA and NATO. Thereby, the USA turns 
out to be a power that is eager to reach unipolar supremacy and as such, Russia’s 
geopolitical goal is to unite world forces in order to resist “Atlanticism” (Smith, 1999, 
485). 
Secondly, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, as well as its predecessor the 
Communist Party of the USSR, stresses the economic and moral decline of Western 
capitalism and blames modern pro-Western liberals for spreading capitalistic ideas. That 
is why communists believe that Russia’s key geopolitical goal is to resist capitalism and 
globalization. This goal may be achieved by resisting the economic strength of the 
Western civilization (Smith, 1999, 486). 
Third, according to the research conducted by Zevina and Makarenko (2010, May 5) in 
2008-2009, the views of the electorate of the “Just Russia” party are quite similar to the 
ones of the “United Russia” voters, but somewhat more conservative and less market-
oriented. The main value for them is the “orthodoxy and pre-revolutionary tradition”. 
Their views on the relations with the West are the same as the views formulated by 
“United Russia” (Zevina and Makarenko, 2010, May 5, 32). 
Thus, it is easy to detect that most of the mentioned political forces have “slavophilic” 
views to at least some degree. Those Russians who share pro-European attitudes are not 
represented in the Duma by any particular party (though individual deputies may, of 
course, be pro-Western oriented).  
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2.2.3 Attributes of Russian political culture 
This chapter examines some of the most important attributes of Russian political 
culture. At the outset, it is worth uncovering the concept of political culture. Berezin 
(1997, 364) defines it as “the matrix of meanings embodied in expressive symbols, 
practices, and beliefs that constitute ordinary politics in a bounded collectivity.” The 
concept has been widely used by social scientists throughout the 20th and 21st centuries 
in a variety of fields including sociology, ethnography, and political studies. As a result, 
it has a great number of connotations depending on the sphere that it operates in. Due to 
the fact that in this study the concept is auxiliary, I will use Bova’s (2010, 24) rather 
general definition, which says that political culture is a set of “shared goals, values and 
pictures of the political world.” The notion is useful for us because my eventual goal is 
to analyze media discourse, and the way discourse is processed by a recipient is shaped 
by the pre-existing meanings. At the same time, it is impossible to determine all of the 
meanings that Russian people assign to Russian-European relations. Hence, the analysis 
of political culture may give us at least some understanding of these meanings. 
The political culture of a country is always unique for historic reasons. Moreover, one 
can find regional differences in political cultures within the same state. It is not 
surprising that Russian political culture is also intrinsically different from the European 
political culture. I believe that its distinguishing characteristics have significant 
influence on the political discourses discussed above. The influence can be explained by 
the fact that the parties function not within a void, but within a framework of a national 
political culture. Moreover, I conjecture that media discourses on Russian-European 
relations will combine the representations derived from different political discourses 
with the basic features of the national political culture.  
At this point, we can move on to examine an article “Russia and Europe after the Cold 
War” (2010), written by Russell Bova, a Professor of Political Sciences and 
International Studies at Dickinson College, USA. The author touches upon five 
attributes of Russian political culture: personalized authorities, statism, sobornost’, 
order, and unity of church and state. First, personalized authorities, according to Bova 
(2010, 24), imply a predisposition towards a desire among Russian people for a strong 
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leader, or powerful monarch. This feature has had a long history in Russian political 
culture that can be confirmed by numerous autocratic rulers from Ivan the Terrible in 
the 16
th
 century right up to Vladimir Putin in the 21
st. Secondly, “statism” can be briefly 
explained as an idea that a citizen should serve a state, rather than a state serving its 
citizens. It means that the role of a state and a state’s government play a much more 
extensive role than in so called “weak states” such as the USA and the majority of the 
European countries. Third, “sobornost’” can be roughly translated as “conciliarism”. 
The term broadly correlates with the idea of collectivism and the prevalence of a 
collective will over an individual identity, but it also has some spiritual and religious 
connotations. The importance of sobornost’ has multiple historic examples, including 
the peasant communities widely spread in tsarist Russia and the kolkhozes, or the 
collective farms, in the USSR. The next feature to be mentioned is Russians’ need for 
order, which is expressed, for instance, in “the desire for ‘a firm hand’”. What is crucial 
for the discussion of Russian-European relations is that order for Russian people turns 
out to be more important than such values as liberty and democracy, which are 
considered to be standard values for Europeans. The last feature is the unity of Church 
and State. It has a purely historic explanation and is tied to the special place that the 
Russian Orthodox Church has always occupied in the Russian politics. Bova (2010, 25) 
concludes the classification by saying that these features are in conflict with the features 
of the European political culture because: 
Instead of rule of law, one finds personalized authority; instead of pluralism, one 
finds statism; instead of individualism, one finds sobornost’; in lieu of the 
emphasis on individual rights, one finds a hunger for order; instead of separation 
of church and state, one finds a more organic unity of church, state and larger 
society. 
He also points out that definitely not everyone would agree with this classification. In 
my view, it seems quite valid, though there could be hardly any classification, which 
would exhaust all the peculiarities of any national culture or mentality. Any 
classification here is never full and is always, to a certain extent, subjective. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the points in the classification correlate with the 
classification formulated by Alexei Bayer (2012, 01 October), a prominent journalist 
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and economist, in the article “Putin's Slavophiles Gain over Westernizers”. For my part, 
when describing Russian political culture, it is necessary to address a couple of more 
issues that seem relevant for the following analysis.  
The first issue is the so called concept of a “powerful Russia”, which, in a certain sense, 
pertains to the idea of statism. If we take Smith’s work (1999) as a foundation, we may 
say that Russians see their country as a leading Eurasian state. This concept infers that 
the overall goal of Russia is to return to the status of a great geopolitical power and 
become one of the leading political and economic forces in the world. According to 
O'Loughlin et al. (2005), the USA and NATO are often seen as a main obstacle and 
competitor with regards to this belief. This belief has hung around since the end of Cold 
War. It is especially obvious with regards to how Russian citizens reckon the USA as a 
destabilizing hegemonic power which has to be balanced by an alternative “pole of 
power”.  In 2008, the concept of “a powerful Russia” was officially stated as a paradigm 
guiding both the internal development of Russia and its relations with other countries.  
What is more, the concept actually has deep historic roots. The legacy of the totalitarian 
USSR and authoritarian tsarist Russia confirms that the tradition of a strong state is 
quite deeply rooted in its history. The special importance of the “powerful Russia” 
concept for the Russian people is also reflected in the results of the survey conducted by 
the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) (Petrova, 2003, Novembers 13). 48% of 
respondents wanted Russia to be seen as a “strong”, “great” or “invincible” power, 
compared to 22% who wanted it to be considered as “rich” or “prosperous” and 6% as 
an “educated”, “civilized” and “cultural” country.  
One more attribute, which characterizes Russian political culture, is a crisis of national 
identity (Kristof, 1967). Though Kristof (1967) reported this phenomenon almost half a 
century ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that national identity continued to 
deteriorate. We can confirm this idea, for example, with the help of the study conducted 
by O'Loughlin, Ó Tuathail, and Kolossov V. (2006, 135), which has revealed that 36% 
of respondents consider themselves as “Eurasianists” meaning that they consider Russia 
as an equally Asian and European country. Subsequently, 44% see it as mainly 
European. Even the broad range of various political discourses on relations with Europe 
indicates that Russian society does not have a unified sense of identity. As a result, there 
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is demand for both a liberal discourse, which portrays Russia as a part of Europe, as 
well as for the discourses that portray Europe as an enemy. Such a disintegration of 
national identity cannot help but negatively affect relations with other countries. Kristof 
(1967, 947) states that identification and need for belonging are crucial factors for both 
individuals and collectives, which has substantial influence on how they behave and 
treat others. 
The reason for providing a list of the attributes of Russian political culture is that they 
may have an impact of the way that Russian-European relations are presented in the 
Russian press and as such, they may explain particular aspects of the representations in 
case they do not directly correspond with the discourses of the political forces.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
Having described the theoretical premises of the research, I would like to highlight 
several major points. The study is conducted within the framework of two main fields: 
media discourse and Russian-European relations. Media discourse can be characterized 
as a type of discourse used by mass media to represent a social practice, in our case 
Russian-European relations. While representing a social practice, media discourse 
interprets and constructs a “common symbolic environment” in the way people 
understand, respond and support it (Gerbner, 1985). In the research, instead of the 
concept a “common symbolic environment”, which is in my opinion quite vague, I use 
the synthesis of the discourses of diverse Russian political parties and the attributes of 
the national political culture. Thus, my research focuses on the analysis of the media 
discourse that can be seen as a bridge between the discourse of the Russian political 
forces and the overall political culture.  
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CHAPTER 3: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AS A RESEARCH METHOD 
As the aim of this research is to explore representations of relations between Russia and 
the EU in the Russian press, the analysis can be divided into three major steps: 
identifying the representations; thorough comprehension of how they are constructed; 
and building them in the broader social context by connecting them with the discourse 
of political parties and national political culture. This chapter provides information on 
how the aim of the research is achieved by describing the choice of a general research 
strategy, a method of data collection and a data analysis process. It also tries to 
rationalize those choices and explain why those methods lead to relevant and reliable 
conclusions. 
 
3.1 Research strategy 
The research question can be answered with the help of qualitative research methods. 
The main reason for choosing qualitative rather than quantitative methods is determined 
by the nature of the studied phenomenon. As I am seeking to distinguish and analyze 
the linguistic images of the relations between countries, the bulk of the acquired data 
will have a non-mathematical character. Moreover, the crucial point of the research is 
my interpretations of those images, “carried out for the purpose of discovering concepts 
and relationships in raw data and then organizing these into a theoretically explanatory 
scheme” (Strauss, Corbin, 1998, 11). That is why qualitative methods which are 
traditionally used when findings are not acquired by statistical procedures and have 
non-mathematical character, seem suitable for my research (Strauss, Corbin, 1998, 11).  
The particular qualitative method that is utilized is critical discourse analysis (CDA). 
The specific reasons for employing CDA and its characteristics and procedures will be 
discussed in the following sub-chapters. 
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3.2 Data collection 
The research data consists of articles discussing Russian-European relations in the 
Pussy Riot case coverage.  The articles come from four respected newspapers. This 
chapter first gives an overview of the newspapers and explains why they have been 
chosen for the research. Secondly, it reminds the reader of the details of the Pussy Riot 
case and describes why it is a suitable example for the analysis. Finally, it defines the 
process of the data collection. 
 
3.2.1 Analyzed newspapers 
I have chosen to analyze four quality newspapers: Izvestia (“Известия”, IZ), 
Kommersant (“Коммерсантъ”, KO), Rossiyskaya gazeta (“Российская газета”, RG), 
and Vedomosti (“Ведомости”, VE). They were selected because they satisfy the 
demands of diverse audiences and as such, they are more likely to give versatile 
representations of relations between Russia and Europe.  
Izvestia was chosen because it has the largest circulation among the quality press. 
According to the information on the web-site Izvesti.ru (2012), Izvestia is targeted at an 
active and well-educated audience with stable income and it covers a wide variety of 
topics including politics, economics, and culture. It has a distinctive pro-governmental, 
conservative editorial policy. The newspaper has been published since 1917. The print 
version is published five times a week, Monday through Friday. As stated in the media 
kit of the newspaper called “Media-kit gazety ‘Izvestia’” (Mediaguide.ru), the current 
circulation is 234,500 issues.  
Vedomosti is a daily business newspaper that has been published since 1999. Vedomosti 
can be characterized as a liberal quality newspaper that expresses pro-western ideas. It 
is unique because it is a mutual project with the Financial Times and the Wall Street 
Journal. It has a circulation of 75,000 issues. In the article “Vedomosti. The Russian 
business newspaper” (Blei Worldwide advertising), Bill Casey, Special Projects Vice-
President of The Wall Street Journal, describes it in the following way: Vedomosti “has 
developed a global reputation for accuracy, independence, fairness and courageous 
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business journalism. We at The Wall Street Journal are proud of our partnership with 
Vedomosti, and proud to be associated with its reporters, editors & executives.” 
The media kit of Kommersant called “Media-kit gazety ‘Kommersant-daily’” says that 
Kommersant - Daily has been published six times a week since 1990 with a daily 
circulation of 117,000 issues (Mediaguide.ru). It is a national social and political 
newspaper with an extended economic section. Kommersant is often characterized as 
the most respected publication because it was one of the newspapers that “laid the 
foundation for the development of intellectual influence of the press” (Vychuba and 
Frolov, 2007, 51). The audience for this newspaper primarily consists of well-educated 
and propertied readers (Vychuba and Frolov, 2007).   
Rossiyskaya gazeta is an official newspaper of the Government of the Russian 
Federation. All federal laws and decrees become effective only after being published in 
Rossiyskaya gazeta. According to a special section for advertisers on the newspaper’s 
website called “Advertising in Rossiyskaya gazeta” (“Reklama v ‘Rossiyskoi gazete’”, 
RG.ru), the circulation of the daily edition is 170,000 issues. The article also affirms 
that a distinctive feature of the audience is the predominance of retirees, who tend to be 
the most conservative part of any society. It is also read by officials of different ranks, 
and clerks of governmental institutions. The latter can be explained by the fact that most 
official bodies subscribe to it in order to get acquainted with the new laws.  
The description of the newspapers shows that they satisfy the demands of diverse 
audiences. I assume that, because of that, they are more likely to provide a wide range 
of different representations than, for example, newspapers targeted at the same 
audience. According to research conducted in May, 2009, by TNS Media Intelligence, a 
section of TNS Global, a markets research company which specializes in media 
research, Kommersant, Rossiyskaya gazeta, and Izvestia are the most important sources 
of business and political news in the Russian media environment (TNS Global, 2009, 
June 5). 
Another important point is the political orientation of the newspapers. Izvestia and 
Rossiyskaya gazeta are pro-government. This fact is obvious when we remember that 
Rossiyskaya gazeta is published by the government. However, the claimed pro-Kremlin 
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attitude of Izvestia needs some explanation: Mickiewicz (2008, 27) asserts that the 
newspaper is “owned by friends or clients of the government, i.e. large companies”. He 
also claims that it may even be considered “to be in government hands, because the 
owners are so close to the government” (Mickiewicz, 2008, 27).  
On the other hand, Kommersant and Vedomosti are more independent in their content - 
at least to the degree which is possible nowadays in Russia because the Russian press is 
generally rated as “not free” by the Freedom House (Freedom House). Lipman (2010, 
157) refers to Vedomosti and Kommersant as liberal high-quality print media that 
“pursue varying degrees of editorial independence and are not controlled or driven by 
loyalty to the state.” To prove this idea, Lipman (2010, 157) recollects how in 2003 
Vedomosti covered the Khodorkovsky case and how thoroughly it depicted a scheme 
the government used in order to take over Khodorkovsky’s oil company. She 
characterizes this investigation as an example of “journalistic work directly challenging 
or defying the authority of the state” Lipman (2010, 157). This fact is crucial to consider 
when we analyze the discourses used in the newspapers because it can directly affect the 
character of the analyzed representations. 
I have to explain two contrapositions that I will refer to in the study. They are: “liberal” 
– “pro-government” and “official” –“unofficial” which I will refer to in the study. Both 
of them are connected to the current political situation in Russia. As it has already been 
mentioned in the literature review, nowadays, the Russian political system can be 
conditionally divided into three blocks: United Russia party, “system opposition”, and 
“non-system” opposition. Thus, in the study, I use the contrapositions “liberal” – “pro-
governmental” primarily regarding the newspapers I have chosen to analyze. The pro-
governmental press means that a newspaper explicitly supports the present government. 
A liberal newspaper mainly shares the views of the pro-Western “non-system” 
opposition. Lipman (2010, 156) recognizes liberal media in Russia as the ones that 
adhere “to professional and ethical standards of independent media, as well as to 
western democratic norms and principles.” Elaborating on discourses, texts, and 
speeches, I quite often use the terms “official” and “unofficial.” “Official” discourse is a 
synonym of the state discourse, meaning that a statement or a text pertains to 
government sources and reflects the position of the dominating powers. Bukovskaya 
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(2006), for example, formulates a term “official political discourse” (OPD) and defines 
it defined as: 
a special form of representation of senior public officials of a state, 
representatives of public authorities, as well as political institutions, government 
body of different levels… In any case, OPD is an expression of official point of 
view, not a means self-expression, and thus, identifies its subject as an official 
person in the pursuance of his duties. 
“Unofficial” implies that a text articulates ideas and states positions that are not 
consistent with the official ones.  
Regarding the chosen newspapers, I can also anticipate questions about their circulation. 
One might wonder if it is reasonable to compare discourses used by a publication that 
prints 234,500 copies, like Izvestia, and a publication with 75,000 copies, like 
Vedomosti. However, such discrepancy is impossible to avoid due to the current 
situation in the country. Only the media which serve relatively small audiences dare to 
express opinions that are inconsistent with the government ones “because the 
government that controls federal channels is indifferent in general towards what others 
do. The article published by Afisha.ru magazine called “New politics. What has 
changed in television” (“Novaya politika. Chto izmenilos na televidenii”, Afisha.ru, 
2012, March 1) states that if an audience is small, you may write, speak and show 
whatever you want, - we do not care. But if you are watched by millions, we beg to 
intervene”. In scientific literature similar ideas are expressed by Lipman, (2010) and 
Mickiewicz (2008). Hence, if I did not accept this discrepancy in circulations, it would 
limit my research solely to the dominating discourse. Moreover, if we compare the 
number of published newspaper copies with the overall Russian population of roughly 
141.9 million people, we will see that on this scale the discrepancy is not that 
significant. 
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3.2.2. The Pussy Riot case 
I will analyze the articles discussing Russian-European relations covering the Pussy 
Riot case. This case is relevant as it has provoked broad public and political discussion 
and demonstrated fundamental differences in perception and culture within Russia and 
in the European countries. Moreover, the Pussy Riot performance, arrest, and the 
following court decision will provide me with enough material for the study as the 
Russian and European political leaders had to respond to these events and this produced 
official discourse that was conveyed to the Russian audience.  
Punk band Pussy Riot hold a performance called the “Punk-prayer: ‘Holy Mother of 
God, Cast Putin Out!’” in the Cathedral of the Redeemer in Moscow on February 21, 
2012. On March 3 two members of the band, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Mariya 
Alekhina were arrested, another member, Ekaterina Smutsevich, was arrested on March 
16. They were arrested on a charge of hooliganism committed because of religious 
hatred and animosity. The legal investigation started on July 30, 2012. On August 17, 
the Khamovnisheskiy court passed the verdict of "guilty" sentencing the arrested 
members of the band to two years in prison.  
The Pussy Riot case has turned out to be one of the most scandalous legal processes in 
Russia in the recent years, and it has been followed carefully inside and outside the 
country. In the Russian federal media as well as in the legal resolution, the case was 
positioned as exclusively religious. The political aspect - “Cast Putin away” - was 
obscured. As a result, according to the study conducted by the Public Opinion Fund 
(Fond Obsh’estvennoe Mnenie), a fund which studies public opinion, more than a half 
of the population of Russia see the verdict as fair (Kozhevina, 2012, August 30). Most 
of the people who share this view are pensioners and residents of small towns. These 
groups belong to the electorate of Vladimir Putin. They justify their opinion by saying 
that “the girls spitted [sic] into the souls of the believers” (Kozhevina, 2012, August 
30). Inside Russia, those who support the band, in other words those who do not agree 
with the legal verdict regardless of whether they approve of the performance or not, 
have an above average income, live in bigger cities and tend to participate in 
demonstrations (Kozhevina, 2012, August 30). At the same time, the band was actively 
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supported by international political and cultural leaders: from 121 members of the 
German Bundestag to Paul McCartney and Madonna (see, for example, RIA Novosti, 
2012, August 3).  
 
3.2.3 Data collection process and final data set 
The analyzed articles were published between August 1 and October 3, 2012.  Still, the 
majority of the articles were published in August 2012, namely during the legal 
investigation of the case in the court and right after the verdict was announced. 
In the course of the data collection, it became apparent that the case was often 
mentioned in the articles, which deal with Russian-European relations, but they are 
neither directly devoted to the description of the case itself nor to its influence on the 
Russian-European relations. This can be seen with the following example: in the 
beginning of October, 2012, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) discussed a report and, as a result, adopted a resolution analyzing how Russia 
commits its obligations to the Council of Europe (CE). The final resolution gave strict 
recommendations to Russia on how to comply fully with the European policies. The 
resolution denounced several recently adopted laws, human right violations, and the, 
what is important, a “patently disproportionate” verdict for Pussy Riot (Parliamentary 
Assembly, 2012, October 2012). This PACE session, which was devoted to the 
discussion of the resolution, was widely covered by the Russian mass media. Though 
the Pussy Riot case was not the main topic in those articles – usually the band was just 
mentioned among other people imprisoned on political grounds. The case itself was 
most likely one of the triggers for the resolution and demonstrated the cultural and 
political contradictions between modern Russia and Europe. This is why I include the 
articles covering the PACE session and the final resolution as well. Eventually, I chose 
October 3, 2012 as the closing boundary because the resolution was released on October 
2, and the coverage in the daily newspapers shrank considerably after the 3th.  
All the articles have been retrieved from the online archives of the particular newspaper. 
This was done out of convenience: otherwise, getting access to all the copies of the 
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analyzed publication would be challenging. The set of articles is only comprised of 
articles from the daily print editions. It means that although all the archives contain both 
the articles that were actually printed in the newspapers and articles that were only 
published in their online versions (as well as articles from the weekly enclosures and 
Internet updates), I have only used the ones that were published in the printed copies. I 
have decided to exclude different online updates because they generally have different 
style, are much shorter and include little relevant context. Thus, the articles that were 
not published in the printed versions have also been excluded.  
All four newspapers have their own search engines. The Kommersant web-site has an 
extended search option that allows you to search through printed editions of the 
newspaper, through other publications printed by the publishing house “Ъ” (e.g. in 
magazines Weekend, Citizen K), through Kommersant-FM (materials from the 
Kommersant radio-station), and Kommersant-online (materials from the online version 
of the newspaper). One can also choose a regional version of an issue and a certain time 
period. I have specified only the starting and closing dates in the search for articles from 
the print edition.  
The Vedomosti web-site gives an opportunity to search through the “newspaper” 
(printed copies), “news” (online news updates), “blogs”, “Friday” (weekend enclosure), 
“How to spend” (an enclosure), “conferences,” and “Vedomosti.ru” (the materials that 
are published only online). The articles can be sorted by date. Thereafter, I have marked 
an option to search through just the “newspaper.”  
The web-site of the Rossiyskaya gazeta offers an extended search option, which, 
however, is limited to specifying the dates and periods. It also allows you to search 
either in articles or in documents. Thus, I have had to separate out the “printed” articles 
manually. This information was given at the top of every article.   
Though the search engine of the Izvestia web-site helps to sort the articles by date or by 
relevance and allows you to search by different sections such as “army”, “culture”, 
”world”,  and etc., it does not provide an opportunity to select only the articles from its 
printed version. So, I have had to do it manually.  
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In order to find the articles related to both the Pussy Riot and Russian-European 
relations, the following sets of search words in Russian have been sequentially applied 
(I provide both the words used in Russian and their English translation): 
 “Pussy Riot”, “Europe”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Европа”, “Россия”); 
 “Pussy Riot”, “European Union”, “Russia”(“Pussy Riot”, “Европейский союз”, 
“Россия”); 
 “Pussy Riot”, “EU”, “Russia”(“Pussy Riot”, “ЕС”, “Россия”);; 
 “Pussy Riot”, “Finland”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Финляндия”, “Россия”);; 
 “Pussy Riot”, “Germany”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Германия”, “Россия”);;  
 “Pussy Riot”, “France”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Франция”, “Россия”);; 
 “Pussy Riot”, “Italy”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Италия”, “Россия”);;  
 “Pussy Riot”, “Great Britain”, “Russia” (“Pussy Riot”, “Великобритания”, 
“Россия”). 
The variations of the sets are based on several considerations. Firstly, the newspapers 
may have different stylistic preferences in terms of using “Europe”, “EU”, or “European 
Union”. Secondly, I wanted to test whether or not there was a difference between the 
discourses used in constructing relations between Russia and the whole EU and Russia 
and some particular countries. I chose Germany, France, the UK, and Italy because they 
were the four largest European economies in 2011 (Sammy, 2011, September 16) and, 
as such, they probably exert more influence on the EU relations with Russia and are 
more likely to be mentioned in articles. Thirdly, the set “Pussy Riot” - “Finland” -
“Russia” was selected because Finland is a neighboring country, which has always had 
close ties with Russia and is also may be covered more actively in the press than the 
other EU countries. 
The overall data set consists of 50 articles. It contains articles of various genres, topics 
and styles, including interviews, standard news stories, and opinion articles. On the one 
hand, that wide range of different materials has made analytical process more 
complicated, but on the other hand, it has ensured that none of the representations under 
study are omitted and as such, guarantees more reliable results. The “Table 1” indicates 
that the articles are distributed unevenly in the newspapers and there are much more 
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articles in Izvestia than in the other newspapers. It is connected to the standard formats 
that the newspapers use. For example, Izvestia publishes many news articles on the 
relevant topic, which sometimes contain repetitive information. In addition, the 
distribution and amount of the articles are not that significant for a qualitative research 
because I am not eager to obtain any statistical results, but to explore the nature of 
representations. 
Table 1. Data set 
Newspaper Number of Articles 
Vedomosti, VE 7 
Kommersant, KO 9 
Izvestia, IZ 24 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, RG 10 
 
The final step of the data collection process involves the preliminary analysis of the 
gathered articles and the elimination of the ones that were inconsistent with the goals of 
the research, for example, the ones that include all the search words but do not give any 
information on international relations. For example, the article “The root of all evil: the 
faith in conspiracy is invulnerable” (VE, 2012, September 18) has been dropped from 
the set because it primarily discusses the nature of the faith in a world conspiracy. It 
mentions Europe with regards to the “European values”, but does not investigate the 
Russian-European relations. The overall selection criterion has been whether an article 
says something about relations between Russia and Europe, either on a political, 
economic or cultural level. For that reason, I have selected, for instance, the article 
called ‘It just smelled bad” (RG, 2012, September 6). It does not provide any 
representations of political relations, but studies particular aspects of the liberal-minded 
population in Russia. However, the author seems to connect liberal attitudes with a pro-
Western propensity. Hence, this idea is relevant for the research as an example of a 
representation of cultural relations.  
I have already mentioned in the introduction that there are many different opinions on 
what Europe is, but by Europe in this research I understand the state-members of the 
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European Union. However, it needed to be emphasized that some of the analyzed 
materials pertain not only to the Russian-European relations, but to the Western-Russian 
relations. As a rule, they consider Europe as part of the Western civilization that 
includes Europe and the USA. In such texts, the word “Europe” might have broader 
cultural implications. I believe that these texts are essential for the research because they 
bring civilizational aspect into the analysis and enable me to retrieve more profound 
implications of the representations, which overflow mundane political and economic 
relations. This is one of the reasons why in the research I apply generally the word 
“Europe” rather than “EU”. 
 
3.3 Data analysis method 
The main research method is a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of representations 
collected from the articles. This method has been applied for three main reasons. Firstly, 
it gives a chance to detect and study “the dialectical relationships between semiosis 
(including language) and other elements of social practices” (Fairclough, 2001, 4). 
According to Fairclough, “textual analysis can give access to the detailed mechanisms 
through which social contradictions evolve and lived out, and the subtle shifts they 
undergo” (Fairclough, 1995, 15). Thus, simply speaking, with its help we can analyze 
what representations and are conveyed by mass media to the Russian population by the 
political forces and examine why these representations are conveyed.  . 
Secondly, CDA is used here due to the fact that unlike other discourse analytical 
approaches such as discourse psychology, critical linguistics, or sociolinguistics, it 
stresses relations between discourses and power while a discourse is always seen as a 
means of expanding power. This idea can be explained by the fact that those “who 
produce the discourse also have the power to make it true – i.e. to enforce its validity, 
its scientific status” (Hall, 2007, 56). In other words, when, for example, a politician 
makes a statement about Russian-European relations that belongs to a particular 
discourse, the discourse adds the power to the statement and gives it a certain social 
impact. 
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Thirdly, according to Huckin (2002), this method, though being used for different types 
of data, has a particular focus on media, including news reports and articles. Besides, 
“for researchers, CDA offers a powerful arsenal of analytic tools that can be deployed in 
the close reading of editorials, op-ed columns, advertisements, and other public texts” 
(Huckin, 2002). 
To begin a more detailed description of the data analysis, it is necessary to repeat that “a 
discourse is the language used in representing a given social practice from a particular 
point of view” (Fairclough, 1995, 56). This implies that our words both depend and 
have influence on social and cultural changes and reflect our power status, while CDA 
tries to explore the connection between language/texts, discursive practices, and social 
and cultural structures and processes (McGregor, 2003). Hence, in my case, I am 
looking at how relations between the EU and Russia are constructed within the 
discourses of different Russian power structures with regard to the Pussy Riot case 
discussion and in the context of Russian political culture. 
Fairclough (1995, 62) says that a critical discourse analysis scheme has to include the 
following elements: the analysis of texts on the linguistic level; their examination from 
the point of view of discursive practices, or intertextual analysis; and finally, an attempt 
to connect them to the sociocultural environment. This scheme is based on the idea that 
the texts are built upon certain discursive practices, meaning the ways they are produced 
and consumed. They, in turn, link the texts to the broader power structures and 
sociocultural conventions and changes.  
Firstly, I will start by carrying out an intertextual analysis. Fairclough (1995, 75) 
defines it in the following way: 
It is an analysis of texts from the perspective of discourse practice, and more 
specifically from the perspective of ‘discourse process’ – in terms of the ways in 
which genres and discourses available within the repertoires of orders of 
discourse are drawn upon and combined in producing and consuming texts, and 
the ways in which texts transform and embed other texts which are in chain 
relationship with them. 
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The most important point of the definition is the idea that intertextual analysis is 
underpinned by discourse practice that connects “textual and the social and cultural, 
between text and sociocultural practice, in the sense that the link between the 
sociocultural and the textual is an indirect one, made by way of discourse practice…” 
(Fairclough, 1995, 59). To sum it up, intertextual analysis may be described as a bridge 
between the articles and “discourse practice” dimensions.  
In order to build this bridge, it will be necessary:  
 to differentiate between official (e.g. opinion of the minister of foreign affairs 
Lavrov in the article “’Reloading’ can’t  last forever” (KO, 2012, October 3)) 
and unofficial (e.g. an opinion article of a political scholar Alexander Rahr 
“Pussy Riot, clash of civilizations, and revolution” (IZ, 2012, August 8)) 
Russian discourse and the discourse of European politicians and experts. This 
approach seems to be the most relevant as it puts emphasis on different levels of 
the power of a discourse and different forms of domination, 
 to determine “hegemonic” and marginalized (“peripheral”) discourses and to see 
what power structures have access to the media, and the extent of this access 
(e.g. Putin vs. opposition leaders). While I divide the newspapers into either 
opposition and pro-government, this differentiation into dominant and 
marginalized is still important within each analyzed newspaper. It is connected 
to the fact that, for example, opposition leaders still have access to the 
governmental press, though this access might be quite limited (see, for example, 
"Gudkov calls upon his collogues in the Duma not to disgrace themselves in 
front of Europe" (IZ, 2012, September 5)). At the same time, Putin’s statements 
play a huge role both in pro-government and liberal media (see "Vladimir Putin 
about Pussy Riot: ‘I do not think that the girls should be judged that strictly" (IZ, 
2012, August 2) and “In the shade of Syria” (VE, 2012, August 2)). 
 to detect broad ideological themes of texts and the motives that may drive 
authors to exploit those themes (Huckin, 2002). In the research, this point 
pertains to differentiation between pro-government and liberal representations. 
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 to identify whose “voices” and doing the “speaking”, and how they are 
embedded into the articles (e.g. how the speeches of pro-government politicians 
are used in the liberal press). It means that I pay close attention to how and why 
a journalist incorporates this or that “voice” in an article (see, for example, the 
analysis of the article “’I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin’” (IZ, 2012, 
September 2)) 
 to identify presuppositions, or what is taken for granted and what is omitted by 
an author. The analysis of presuppositions constitutes an important part of the 
study because the way a text positions a reader depends on what values, 
believes, and opinion a journalist ascribes to him or her (Fairclough, 1995, 107). 
I apply this technique, for example, in the analysis of the article “Civilization 
without roots” (RG, 2012, August 28). 
Thus, in my opinion, intertextual analysis is the crucial stage of the research because it 
yields most of the data that are necessary for us: it helps to retrieve the common 
representations of the EU countries in relation to Russia as well as to analyze the 
majority of the aspects needed on the semantic level. 
The second stage is a descriptive linguistic analysis of the separated representations. 
With its help it is possible to examine both the meanings and forms of texts more 
closely. Fairclough notes that it may be quite effective to try to separate a meaning of a 
text from its linguistic peculiarities and to contrast these two aspects, but in practice it 
can be hardly achieved because a meaning often conditions certain forms and genres 
(Fairclough, 1995, 57). That is why, as a rule, intertextual and linguistic analyses take 
place simultaneously because separating out and examining a type of discourse is also 
bound to examining its unique linguistic aspects. This is why the analysis chapter is not 
divided into intertextual and linguistic sections.  
Nevertheless, I want to highlight the fact that the thesis will focus mainly on intertextual 
analysis while linguistic analysis is applied as a subsidiary tool that helps if there are 
any difficulties on the intertextual level. Huckin (2002) points out that at this stage one 
can pay attention at the word/phrase, sentence/utterance, and text levels. A researcher 
may choose to analyze dozens of different aspects of language and linguistic 
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expressions depending on the salience of the aspects and the purposes of a study. In my 
research, I am going to concentrate primarily on two features:  
a) vocabulary level: “connotation” - as the nuances of the meaning of a word. This 
point can be illustrated with the word “mollify” in the phrase “Our delegation could not 
mollify the European parliamentarians”, which imports that Russia is ready to make 
concessions, while Europe is not ("PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia”, IZ, 
2012, October 2). The linguistic technique is used to give a certain additional 
framework to the main meaning of a text and might be crucial in reflecting the position 
of a power structure. 
b) textual level: genres of the chosen texts (interview, news articles, analytics). In 
other words, the standard types or genres. Genre differentiation is significant when I 
analyze interviews, for example, the interview with Sergei Lavrov “’Reloading’ can’t  
last forever” (KO, 2012, October 3) because the genre peculiarities have direct influence 
on the articulation of a representations. In case of interviews, as we will see later, we 
may identify two representations: one articulated by a journalist and one articulated by 
an interviewee. 
The third stage is the analysis of sociocultural practices. Fairclough claims that this 
analysis has many angles and dimensions. At this level, I have carried out the content 
analysis considering the internal feelings and implications of the retrieved 
representations, and their roles and purposes. This stage also is conclusive in a sense 
because it provides visible connections between the theoretical and practical parts of the 
research by demonstrating which representations of Russian-European relations have 
more power and influence and why. 
 
3.4. Validity, limitations, and ethical considerations 
In addition to the data analysis method, it is necessary to address the question of the 
validity of the research. Validity turns out to be an extremely debatable issue when it 
comes to general qualitative research design based primarily on subjective 
interpretations and the personal perceptions of a researcher. However, it becomes even 
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more challenging to validate a study based on CDA. Teun van Dijk (1997, 5-6) 
ascertains that it is so hard to differentiate “good” and “bad” discourse analysis because 
words, phrases and texts never have fixed exhaustive meanings: these meanings depend 
on a researcher’s experience, perceptions, and tend to change overtime. This is why it is 
not a simple task to come up with good evaluation criteria for research based on critical 
discourse analysis.  
While there are an innumerable amount of different approaches and strategies for a 
qualitative research validation, I will use the scheme suggested by Creswell (2006). 
This scheme is applied mainly to an ethnographic research, but some of the criteria can 
be also used to validate a CDA study. Firstly, Creswell (2006, 208) notices the necessity 
of peer reviews and external checks from a “devil’s advocate” “who asks hard questions 
about method, meaning and interpretation.” This criterion is secured by research 
approval process at University of Helsinki. The next point seems to be self-evident, as it 
highlights the importance of refining the research question in case of a negative result. 
In other words, all data have to fit well and support the hypothesis being researched. A 
researcher also has to clearly indicate all the limitations of her study and her personal 
biases or assumptions. This criterion is addressed in the sub-chapters “Limitations and 
ethical considerations” and “Limitations and further research”. Finally, one of the 
crucial ways to validate CDA research is to provide thick descriptions of the phenomena 
that will let a reader “transfer information to other settings”, which by this point might 
have been partly achieved (Creswell, 2006, 209). 
I must elaborate on three main limitations that affect this study. The first two are 
embedded in the research design and the last one pertains to ethical problems. The first 
one is grounded in the nature of CDA research. As it has already been mentioned 
before, CDA does not give strict guidelines on what aspects of discourse should be 
studied and as a result, it keeps many options open. Thus, there is a chance that the 
researcher may stress some less significant aspect the data, while some cardinal locus 
remains neglected. Therefore, some significant information can be missed. Additionally, 
as CDA is based on researcher’s perceptions, there will always be the possibility for 
misinterpretation, thus leading to wrong conclusions or missing information.  
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The second limitation deals with the linguistic analysis that underpins CDA. As all the 
analyzed articles are written in Russian, while the main language of the research is 
English, I have had to translate a sufficient amount of the texts. As a result, some 
information could be lost due to the fact that I do not have a specific academic 
background in translation and linguistics. Moreover, some of the articles are rich in 
metaphors and untranslatable puns. Many words may have a different connotation or 
even meaning for people coming from different cultural backgrounds.  
The ground on which the third limitation rests has clear ethical implication. I have to 
admit that being a Russian citizen, I adhere to a certain political position. I do not 
support the current Russian government headed by the president Vladimir Putin and I 
do not support its politics. Thus, while analyzing discourses, I might be inclined to 
sympathize with the liberal discourse. Moreover, some of the retrieved representation 
may also be bias due to the fact that I myself have a well formed opinion of the relations 
between Russia and Europe. As a result, it might be hard to stay away from my own 
perceptions of the state of affairs, especially if a certain representation contradicts my 
views and beliefs, and concentrate only on the was representation is portrayed. Hence, 
the only means to avoid biases is to be constantly aware of this challenge and pay closer 
attention and scrutinize the discourses more thoroughly.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter was designed to outline the research procedures that have been conducted 
in order to achieve the purpose of the study. Thereby, the research is based on 
qualitative data analysis primarily due to the fact that it aims at investigating and 
interpreting non-mathematical data. The data corpus comprises of 50 articles from four 
Russian newspapers, with both a pro-government and a liberal orientation. It has been 
decided that the best method to adopt for this investigation was critical discourse 
analysis because it addresses the power relation of different discourses. The CDA is 
going to be carried out according to the three-fold scheme suggested by Fairclough, thus 
including linguistic, intertextual, and sociocultural analysis of the articles (Fairclough, 
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1995, 62). Finally, the methods of validation and some of the limitations were identified 
and reported. 
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CHAPTER 4: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE. REVEALING THE 
REPRESENTATIONS OF RUSSIAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis. One of the key findings of the 
research is that the Pussy Riot case is most commonly used in both pro-government and 
liberal press to collide Europe and Russia. Consequently, this representation can be seen 
as hegemonic.  It has also been possible to retrieve two representations that clearly 
belong to the liberal discourse: “Europe as a mentor for Russia” and “Europe as savior”. 
The representations “Europe as an economic partner” and “Russia as an integral part of 
Europe” cannot be clearly connected to a particular discourse and are discussed 
separately. 
Therefore, the chapter has the following structure. Firstly, I start by scrutinizing the way 
the representations are deployed by the newspapers with the help of intertextual 
analysis. In other words, I explain what kind of representations different newspapers are 
more likely to exploit. I try to provide evidence of connections between the official 
press and hegemonic representations and between the liberal press and the 
representations of Europe as a mentor for Russia and Europe as savior. Secondly, I 
move on to the next sub-chapter where I uncover the specific details of all the 
representations. The sub-chapter sequentially focuses on each of them by applying 
intertextual and linguistic analyses.  
 
4.1 General patterns of the deployment of representations in the newspapers 
The representations that have been discovered are not deployed evenly across different 
newspapers. Though there is a certain correlation between a representation of Russian-
European relations and a newspaper, it is not absolute (see APPENDIX 2). For 
example, if one takes a representation of the relations as a collision of civilization, he 
cannot be absolutely sure that it belongs to Rossiyskaya gazeta. However, I was able to 
detect some general patterns of the deployment of different representations. Thus, the 
relations as a political, civilizational, or religious collision is a representation that is 
found mainly in Rossiyskaya gazeta and Izvestia. Seeing Europe as a mentor or a savior 
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is more typical for Kommersant and Vedomosti. The official press refers to those 
representations only when it wants to illustrate the position of the liberals, quite often 
ironically. The representations of Europe as a purely economic partner of Russia as well 
as the representation of Russia as an integral part of Europe were found quite rarely. I 
can suggest that they are associated not with certain newspapers or discourses, but 
rather with the ideas of particular scholars and politicians. Now I would like to address 
the peculiar aspects of the deployment of different representations in the analyzed 
newspapers. 
The hegemonic representation, according to which Russian-European relations are 
framed as a collision fully, dominates the pro-government press. The possible 
explanation might be connected with the fact that Rossiyskaya gazeta and Izvestia, as a 
rule, fully rely on official governmental sources. The opinion articles are generally 
written by conservative experts and pro-government politicians.   
It is even possible to say that this representation is presupposed in the Russian pro-
Kremlin press and “the clash” is given as self-evident. The latter quotation provides a 
clear example of a linguistic presupposition: the journalist in “Civilization without 
roots” (RG, 2012, August 8) takes it for granted that Europe’s “appraisals” of Russia are 
“hasty, biased and politically committed and, what is more, that they have been that way 
for a while” (e.g. “another tide”, “…for some human right organization and mass 
media… it is just an opportunity to brawl in the anti-Russian field once again”). The 
fact that the journalist does not see a reason to articulate the foundation for these 
statements also means that this view is supposed to already be shared by his readers. By 
the same token, the article "Moscow votes against" (RG, 2012, October 3) reads that 
“the [PACE] deputies again criticized Russia for the decisions made in the political and 
juridical sphere” and quotes the State Duma deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov in saying that 
the PACE resolution is “an ordinary anti-Russian attack.”  
It is worth mentioning that in particular cases journalists working in the official press 
even have to make a specific effort to articulate the hegemonic representation, for 
instance, when their interviewees or other sources of information have alternative 
opinions on relations between Russian and Europe. This idea can be better explained 
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with the help of the interview in Izvestia with Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe. The opening sentence of the article is: “We do not consider the 
banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as our goal” (IZ, 2012, October 2). 
On the intertextual level, we can see how the journalist’s “lead” and questions 
correspond with the representation of a “collision” and frame the ideas of the 
interviewer, which could also be rather connected with another discourse. I elaborate on 
this example in more detail in the sub-chapter devoted specifically to the representation 
of the collision. 
In addition to this, since the representation of European-Russian relations as a collision 
is not solid, some articles combine different aspect of this representation. This is 
exemplified by the article “Civilization without roots” (RG, 2012, August 8). The article 
can be conditionally divided into two parts and the first one is the lead written by the 
journalist. In particular, the journalist stresses the idea of “double standards” as a cause 
of the collision between Russia and Europe. The second part is the reported speech of 
Lukashevich, the official representative of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, who 
believes that the clash is intrinsically tied to the fact that “post-modernist” Europe 
“forgets about its religious roots”. Lukashvich portrays Russia as a country of high 
moral and spiritual standards, thus making it superior to Europe. He also denounces the 
fact that “they [many people in the West] support the full freedom of the actions similar 
to the ones the Pussy Riot band is ‘famous’ for” (“Civilization without roots”, RG, 
2012, August 8).  What we can observe here is a visceral but obviously unintended 
contradiction. Lukashevich thinks that a main cause of the wide gap between Russia and 
Europe is the contradiction between “religious” Russia and “post-religious” Europe, 
while the journalist thinks that it because of the European policies that are based on 
“double-standards”. It is notable that both of these aspects belong to the same 
“collision” discourse.  
This contradiction can be found not only in the meanings, but also in the style of the 
two parts of the article. While the journalist uses more colloquial and ironic language 
(e.g. “in order to spite”), Lukashevich applies an official, or business, style in general 
(e.g. “the fundamental international legal apparatus regarding human rights 
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determines…”) and even jumps to an elevated style when he speaks about Russian 
morality (e.g. “the oblivion of the moral norms… is baneful”) (RG, 2012, August 8).  
Having thus discussed how the official press uses different representations of Russian-
European relations, it is time to consider this issue with regards to the liberal press.   
The “collision” representation would not be hegemonic if it was not present in the 
liberal press as well as in the pro-government press. The analyzed liberal press, 
Vedomosti and Kommersant, cannot avoid highlighting it when presenting the point of 
view of governmental officials: for example, Tarasenko in the article called "Segey 
Naryshkin disposed of the PACE's amendments" (KO, 2012, September 28) quotes 
Sergey Naryshkin, who is speaking about the anti-Russian attitudes of the PACE 
leaders.  
However, while the “collision” representation constitutes the core message of the 
articles from the pro-government Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta, Vedomosti and 
Kommersant are more inclined to add some marginal aspects or at least offer some 
additional opinions to the hegemonic one. For instance, the Kommersant article "Segey 
Naryshkin disposed of PACE's amendments" (KO, 2012, September 28) is clearly 
divided into two parts. The first part is dedicated to the description of the position of the 
Russian official delegation on the forthcoming PACE session and includes the 
commentaries of Sergey Naryshkin, Chairman of the State Duma, and Aleksey 
Pushkov, Chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee. Then, in the 
second part, the author moves on to outlining the European and, finally, comes to 
presenting an alternative understanding of the modern relations between Russia and 
Europe by referencing a geopolitical expert called Fedor Lukjanov. As it has been said, 
in contrast to this article, the majority of the articles in Rossiyskaya gazeta and Izvestia 
are limited to the description of the Russian official position. It is possible to conclude 
that the liberal press is more prone to the collision of different types of representations 
within one article. For example, in an interview with the head of the ministry of foreign 
affairs, Sergei Lavrov, a journalist definitely shares liberal views and doubts, while 
Lavrov articulates the representation of “collision” caused by Western intrusion into 
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Russian domestic affairs (“Reloading’ can’t  last forever”,  KO, 2012, October 3). This 
will be discussed in detail in the following sub-chapter. 
Nevertheless, the dominant representations in the liberal press are “Europe as a mentor” 
and “Europe as a savior”. This type of representation is rarely found in the pro-
government newspapers. Generally, unlike Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta, the 
Kommersant and Vedomosti authors tend to focus on the point of view of the European 
politicians, while not giving a lot of consideration to the opinions of Russian authorities. 
Thus, in the article "European deputies stood up for the Russian one" (KO, 2012, 
September 14) the author extensively quotes the representatives of the European 
parliament, the resolution itself and the fallen into out of Kremlin’s favor deputy of the 
State Duma, Gennady Gudkov. 
 
4.2 Russian-European relations as a cultural/political/religious collision  
Having broadly shown how different representations are used in different newspapers, I 
want to now describe some specific aspects of these representations. 
The differences between the attitudes towards the performance and punishment of the 
punk band Pussy Riot in Russia and Europe are often symbolically transferred to the 
clash of the European and Russian civilizations on political, religious, and cultural 
levels. This representation is clearly  formulated in the opinion article “Europe-Russia: 
what we spell the death of” (Rahr, RG, 2012, September 11). Its author, famous German 
political expert Alexander Rahr, describes Russian-European relations by saying that: 
“New conflicts shake the relations of Russia and Europe. Many people in Germany 
believe that the mutual understanding and connection between the West and East are 
hopelessly lost. The idea of the common European home is dead” (Rahr, RG, 2012, 
September 11). 
Now let us look more closely at the examples of how this representation is constructed. 
One of the most distinct instances is the previously mentioned interview with Thorbjorn 
Jagland (“We do not consider the banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as 
our goal”, IZ, 2012, October 2). The subheading “Secretary General of the-Council of 
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Europe speaks about the attitudes of the European authorities towards our country” sets 
the tone for the interview right away by using the “they” vs. “we” dichotomy. The lead 
text written by the journalist reads: “And the countries, included in this Council, must 
follow the recommendations, Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General of the-CE thinks” 
grammatically stressing the necessity and obligation of following these 
recommendations by using the strong model verb “must”. For a Russian reader that tone 
may mean that the interviewee in particular and the council in general try to speak to 
Russia from a position of strength. The interviewer tries repeatedly to show that the 
Council of Europe tries to affect Russia by asking questions such as: “if those 
recommendations are adopted, what consequences they may have for Russia”; “what, in 
this situation, the control by the cabinet council may lead to”, “will Russia be banished 
from the Council of Europe” (“We do not consider the banishment of Russia from the 
Council of Europe as our goal”, IZ, 2012, October 2).  All the questions imply that the 
recommendations may have negative consequences for the country.  
In contrast, Thorbjorn Jagland is very accurate in expressing himself and putting his 
ideas into words: “But we in the Council of Europe in general and the cabinet council in 
particular are anxious about … some laws”; “There are some consideration I would like 
to discuss with the Russian authorities”; “I will try to find the most effective way of 
using the information I am acquiring in the course of monitoring” (“We do not consider 
the banishment of Russia from the Council of Europe as our goal”, IZ, 2012, October 
2). Jagland does not mention any actions towards Russia, apart from general 
considerations and overall analysis of the situation. It sets his statements against the 
journalist’s concerns and the body of the interview against the heading and the lead. The 
following conclusion can be drawn from the article: the questions asked by the 
journalist and Jagland’s statements highlighted in the heading and the lead contrast with 
the general tone of Jagland’s discourse due to the fact that the journalist tries to sustain 
and reproduce the representation of European-Russian relations as a collision of 
civilizations, despite the fact that his interviewee tries to convey a different perception 
to the Russian readers. 
A similar approach is also used in the interview with the PACE President Jean-Claude 
Mignon (“I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin”, IZ, 2012, September 2). While 
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Mignon stresses the basic order and regulations of the CE and calls for mutual dialogue, 
the journalist seems to be interested in trying to detect any latent disparities or hostile 
attitudes towards Russia. 
In addition, I must note that the representation of “the collision” is not just based on one 
idea. In truth, there are several aspects that shape Russian-European relations as a clash 
rather than as integration. In accordance with the first one, the clash of Europe and 
Russia is caused by the preconceived opinions and prejudices against Russia. According 
to the second one, the cause of the clash is the desire of European politicians to 
intervene in Russian domestic affairs. The third one is the idea that Russia and Europe 
are two fully different civilizations, mentalities, and as a result, they will never be able 
to understand each other fully. I call these aspects “double-standard policies”, “Europe 
as an intruder”, and “mentality/religious collision”. One must remember that those 
aspects should not be thought of as being absolutely separate from each other because 
quite often they are intertwined together in the same article. In the following sub-
chapters, I will elaborate on them in more detail. 
 
4.2.1 Double-standard policy 
The first aspect to analyze is the so called “double-standard policy”, which Europe 
supposedly applies to Russia. Generally speaking, it can be conceived as the idea that 
Europe is biased against Russia and applies higher standards to it than to other 
developed countries. As it has been mentioned, this representation is common for 
Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta.   
This idea can be illustrated with the article “And how does it work there” (RG, 2012, 
August 20). The whole article is devoted to bringing up examples from different 
European countries of how the European law has treated people who have not respected 
sacred objects or buildings. The article is written in an extremely ironic manner. Here is 
an excerpt from the article. 
After a photographer decided to make a picture of a man and woman dressed in 
costumes of Adam and Eve on the solea of Cologne Cathedral in 1977, in 
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accordance with the German law, he had to be on parole for four month and pay 
the fine of 1.5 thousand euro. And latter-day ‘Adam’ had to pay around two 
thousand euro” (“And how does it work there”, RG, 2012, August 20).  
Then, the article scrutinizes the regulations of the European court of human right 
(ECHR) on “self-expressions and performances”. For example, it says “all the more so, 
Russia joined the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
in 1998 and took the obligations to consider the ECHR position…” and presents some 
of the statements from the convention that may seem contradictory to the negative 
reaction of some Western politicians with regards to the Pussy Riot case. Thus, 
Rossiyskaya gazeta mentions that “the ECHR thinks that the government has the right to 
take measures of state and legal… response in order ‘to prevent certain people from 
having an impression that their religious views have become the object of unfounded 
and insulting attacks’” (“And how does it work there”, RG, 2012, August 20). What the 
author obviously implies is that Russia behaves correctly and tries to comply with the 
European regulations, while its European partners find baseless reasons for challenging 
Russia. This is seen as a double standard because these reasons do not correspond with 
European standards. 
In general, the representation of “the double-standards” is often bound to the idea of the 
following proverb “people who live in glass houses should not throw stones”. One can 
find it in a variety of articles, including “Should not go” (RG, 2012, September 28), 
“Segei Lavrov proves himself as a sport diplomat” (KO, 2012, August 21), and “The 
Ministry of foreign affairs has detected the conflict of civilizations in the sentence to 
Pussy Riot” (IZ, 2012, August 22). Let me provide several more examples. According 
to the article “Moscow is ready for the criticism” (RG, 2012, September 28), Aleksey 
Pushkov, Chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee, assures people 
that “… Russia is not going to fulfill any violent appeals based upon double-
standards…” by saying that “We are going to have dialogue only on the basis of co-
operations, without any diktat.”  
Similarly, Marc Rousset, a French political scholar and historian, expresses the same 
view in his commentary in the article “The Crusade” (RG, 2012, August 22):  
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… In France acts of hooliganism or violations of religious feelings are punished 
by a prison sentence. Let someone try to arrange something like this [the Pussy 
Riot performance] in the Notre Dame de Paris or in the Great Mosque  … I am 
sure that the reaction of congregation and, I hope, of the authorities would be 
representative. 
This commentary is crucial for my analysis, as well as for the readers of Rossiyskaya 
gazeta because it introduces the opinion of a Western historian: it appears that even the 
representatives of the European elite confirm the idea of “double-standards” though 
they do not have any reason to slander their homeland.  
All of these provide sufficient evidence that the representation of “double-standard” 
policies is deeply rooted in the official discourse. This representation as a whole infers 
that the contradictions between Russia and Europe are caused by a “double standard” 
that Europe has applied to Russia and that Russia could be an integral part of Europe if 
Europe treated it impartially.  
 
4.2.2 Europe as an intruder 
The second explanation of the collision that one can find in the Russian press is the 
alleged attempt of Europe to intrude into Russian domestic affairs. Let me start with 
some examples. 
In the Izvestia article "PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia” (IZ, 2012, October, 
2) we can see Europe portrayed as trying to impose its values on Russia. In response to 
this intrusion, the Russian delegation does everything it can to resist this influence and 
protect the interests of the country: “Moscow responded to the preparing resolution ... 
ultimately strictly”, the “Russian delegation became strictly opposing, fighting against 
the project of the resolution” ("PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia”, IZ, 2012, 
October, 2). The same idea can be found in the previously mentioned interview with 
Mingon “I can come to Moscow to meet Naryshkin” (IZ, 2012, September 2). One of 
the remarks of the journalist shows her surprise: “But Pussy Riot is not included in the 
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obligations [of Russia to the CE]!” meaning that the CE is looking for loopholes to put 
extra-pressure on Russia, in addition to the legal means that it has the right to use.  
What is central to the analysis of this representation is that Russia is portrayed as if it 
remained open to dialogue with Europe despite all the pressure Europe puts on it. 
Hence, it is possible to derive the following conclusion: if Europe was a bit more 
flexible, Russia, in turn, would be ready to yield as well. This point can be illustrated 
with the following quotation: “Our delegation could not mollify the European 
parliamentarians”, which implies that Russia is ready to make concessions, while 
Europe is not ("PACE adopted a tough resolution on Russia”, IZ, 2012, October 2). In 
another article, one of the representatives of the Russian delegation comments on the 
resolution in the following way: “this time could repulse” ("PACE adopted a tough 
resolution on Russia”, IZ, 2012, October 2). It means that the European 
recommendations are seen by the delegation as unhelpful and obstructive.  
Moreover, sometimes the European attempts to influence Russia are understood and 
portrayed as attempts to violate Russian sovereignty. We can see this in the article 
“Moscow is ready for the criticism” (RG, 2012, September 28), where Aleksey Pushkov 
says “However, some conditions make these document deliberately unacceptable for the 
Russian delegation. It says that we have to revise our legislation.” Further on, he 
continues “it is absolutely obvious that nobody in the world revises their laws in 
accordance with the requirements from abroad. We remain a sovereign state, though we 
are the member of the Council of Europe. Sometimes the CE forgets about it” 
(“Moscow is ready for the criticism”, RG, 2012, September 28).  (See also the article 
“PACE will not see the Speaker of the State Duma” (2012, IZ, September, 27): 
“”Nobody in the world revises their laws in accordance to the requirements from 
abroad,’ – Pushkov declares. - ‘Besides, the European countries as well as the USA 
should pay attention on their own rules. Participation in demonstrations is always 
penalized by imprisonment or huge fines.’”)  I have to mention here that, as has been 
discussed in the literature review, the question of sovereignty and power is a central 
aspect of Russian political discourse because it underpins the concept of “a powerful 
Russia”.  
57 
 
What is only implied in the article “Moscow is ready for the criticism” (RG, 2012, 
September 28) is openly stated by the Aleksander Rarh in the article “Europe-Russia: 
what we spell the death of” (RG, 2012, September 11). Rahr says that the West: 
…sees itself in full authority to export its idea of a liberal revolution all around 
the world. In the West, people piously believe that democracy and human rights 
are universal values of all the mankind and that liberty should be implanted and 
even forced… When the Russian elite reproaches the West for undermining the 
principles of the state sovereignty and, thus, for violating international law, it 
gets the following response: the world order has changed, when human right are 
violated somewhere, the liberal West has a moral right to intervene into 
domestic affairs of other countries protecting the weak from arbitrariness of 
dictators. 
It is clear that this idea is not well received by the Russian government and most likely 
by many Russian people as well because they still, to a certain extent, show their Soviet 
imperialistic views and believe that Europe does not have any right to impose its liberal 
ideas. 
 
4.2.3 Cultural/spiritual collision 
The third reason underlying the conflict between Russia and Europe that I could find in 
the articles is a cultural or civilizational clash. In my opinion, this image is one of the 
most contradictory ones because it has many variations. Some authors just stress the 
differences between Russian and European mentalities (e.g. “Sick in the head”, (IZ, 
2012, September 12)), others portray Europe as Satan trying to destroy Orthodox Russia 
(e.g. Dugin’s quotations in “Eurasians threatens to roll ‘March of millions’ under 
asphalt” (IZ, 2012, September, 14)). 
It seems that the most wide-spread basis for this representation is the idea that Europe is 
“post-religious”, “postmodernist”, or “post-Christian”, while Russia is the only country 
adhering to “genuine Christianity” and spirituality. This position is well explained in the 
commentary in the article “The Crusade” (RG, 2012, August 22) by the German 
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political scientist Alexander Rahr. The article actually deals with the action of the 
Ukrainian feminist protest movement called FEMEN whose representatives destroyed a 
monumental cross commemorating the victims of political repressions as a response to 
the Pussy Riot sentence. Rahr says:  
But is seems that everything goes towards the war of cultures, of civilizations, 
where the Western post-religious world, rather aggressively and dogmatically 
worshipping liberal values, is on the one side and the fundamentalist Christian 
traditions of the non-Christian societies, to which I ascribe Russia and the 
Ukraine and where religion was prohibited for 80 years, are on the other side. 
(“The Crusade”, RG, 2012, August 22). 
Alexander Rahr elaborates even more upon this concept in the article “Europe-Russia: 
what we spell the death of” (RG, 2012, September 11) also published in Rossiyskaya 
gazeta:  
 … After the communist persecution of religion for almost the whole 20th 
century, Russia now is trying to develop according to the neo-Christianity… 
Mockery of the own religion, century-old spiritual traditions and priests is not 
considered to be a bad taste among the Western intellectuals… In Russia 
everything is different… Even unbelieving Russians sympathize with religion 
because they understand that the return to traditional roots is the guarantee of the 
nation’s development. 
At the same time, sometimes this representation can also imply Russian moral and 
spiritual superiority over Europe. In this sense, the already mentioned article “Crusade” 
(RG, 2012, August 22), which deals with the actions of the aforementioned FEMEN 
movement, provides a distinctive example of this. The aspect that is important for the 
research is found in the phrase: “Practically they [the activists]… are not involved in the 
investigative actions, willingly communicate with the fans online, and declare that 
Europe will protect them because they are almost like Timoshenko, but younger.” This 
phrase in particular as well as the whole article refers to the idea of the disruptive 
influence of Europe. Like many other former soviet republics, the Ukraine had two 
geopolitical alternatives in geopolitics after the collapse of the Soviet Union: to co-
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operate more closely with Russia or to strive for Western integration. As the Ukraine 
chose Europe, it is often seen as having betrayed Russia in Russian politics. “The 
Crusade” (RG, 2012, August 22) particularly accentuates the idea of what can happen in 
a country that was “seduced” by Europe: one can even destroy a cross without any legal 
prosecution. The article, thus, intrinsically gives a warning to the Russians who are 
inclined to share European values and implicitly rebukes Europe for its spiritual 
inferiority.  
A more moderate version of the representation can be found in the article “Sick in the 
head” (IZ, 2012, September 12). Its author criticizes Russian intellectuals who choose to 
leave Russia for the USA or Europe because “the majority of the western citizens have 
very approximate idea of the past and present Russian history, of the peculiarities of the 
Russian mentality.” It is possible to infer out of this phrase that Europeans and Russians 
will never be able to fully understand each other because they are intrinsically different 
and a Russian person does not fit in well in Europe. 
Finally, I must provide an example from a speech made by Alexander Dugin, the leader 
of the Eurasian Union and a famous Russian philosopher and political scholar. Dugin is 
quoted in Rossiyskaya gazeta as saying: “Satan is coming… Everyone who sympathizes 
with liberals, Pussy Riot, the West belongs to Satan…If America and Europe stand 
behind the organization of anti-Putin demonstrations, billions of other civilizations 
stand behind the Eurasians...” (“Eurasians threatens to roll ‘March of millions’ under 
asphalt”, RG, 2012, September 14). Of course, it is quite a radical statement, but the fact 
that it was included in an article of a federal newspaper shows that it may be regarded as 
an extreme example of the hegemonic representation. Moreover, it also provides an 
example of the combination of two aspects of “the collision” representation, namely 
“Europe as an intruder” and the religious collision. 
 
4.2.4 Media war against Russia 
To wrap up the representation of Russian-European relations as a collision of two 
civilizations, I would like to touch on such the belief in a conspiracy by the Western 
60 
 
countries against Russia or in a media/propaganda war against Russia. I do not consider 
it as a separate representation, but it is important to understand this idea as it may be 
one of the framing premises of the “collision” representation.  This idea is not quite 
clearly articulated in the press. Usually it is just mentioned as a matter of fact when 
journalists or their sources try to explain the origin of the religious clash or the supposed 
desire of Europe to influence Russia. 
This idea is explained well by the author of the article “Punk-prayer and the 
responsibility of the government: Why they cannot be forgiven”, Sergey Markov 
(Markov, VE, 2012, August 17). He says that for the majority of Russian society, the 
actions of Pussy Riot are “a part of the strategic campaign profaning the values sacred 
for the Russian nation. The final goal of this campaign is the annihilation of Russian 
nation as a subject of world history.” Therefore, 
the Pussy Riot action is not a folly of young girls, but a part of a global 
conspiracy against Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church… The further the 
campaign in support of Pussy Riot is deployed, the more foreigners are taking 
part in it, - the more confirmation it gives to the version of conspiracy. (Markov, 
VE, 2012, August 17). 
The conspiracy is also bound up in the belief that Europe conducts a “media war” 
against Russia: “The hype around the Pussy Riot must be considered in connection with 
the fact that though the Cold war is over, the information war against Russia is going 
on” (The Crusade”, RG, 2012, August 22). Subsequently, a well-known Russian 
journalist, Arkadiy Mamontov, mentions in his interview to Izvestia that actions against 
Russia, including the Pussy Riot performance, are arranged in order to destroy the 
Orthodox culture ("Arkadiy Mamontov: ‘There is no ordered information. These are my 
views’”, IZ, 2012, September 12) 
At this point, it is also important to say that the “media/propaganda war” idea is shared 
not only by the journalists working in pro-government newspapers, but rather is a 
deeply ingrained concept in the Russian official politics. This can be seen in the 
following quote from the Kommersant interview with the head of the ministry of 
foreign affairs Sergei Lavrov:  
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Unfortunately, Russia often has to face rough distortion of truth and direct lies 
by some of the world mass media… The same thing is the Pussy Riot 
propaganda campaign, hyped up in the West. Haste and partiality of the most of 
the commentaries from the EU countries and from the USA allow concluding 
that the authors did not bother to examine the circumstances of the case, process 
of judicial session and norms of the Russia legislation. (“’Reloading’ cannot last 
forever”, KO, 2012, October 3) 
Having thus outlined the main features of the representation of European and Russian 
relations as a collision, let me move forward and describe the representations of the 
liberal press. 
 
4.3 Representations of the liberal press 
While I have enough evidence to conclude that Russian-European relations are most 
commonly portrayed as two collided civilizations, there are a number of other 
representations which constitute an entirely different picture of the relationship. In the 
liberal press, we can observe a different set of relations than in the pro-government 
press. I call them: “Europe as a mentor” and “Europe as a savior”.  Some of the aspects 
of these representations are parallel or similar to the representation of relations as a 
collision, but with a number of different connotations. In the following sub-chapters, I 
am going to uncover some of their key aspects and features.  
 
4.3.1. Europe as a mentor 
One of the essential representations for the Russian liberal press is the Europe as a 
mentor or a teacher that tries to educate and implant European values in Russia or 
“cure” the authoritarian Russian regime. Though the representation has some variations, 
it most likely originates from within official European discourse because after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe has always seen the establishment of Western-
style democracies as its main mission in Eastern Europe. Basically, this representation 
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can be seen as the reverse side of the “intrusion into Russian affairs” idea. The 
difference pertains to the fact that “Europe as a mentor” implies a positive influence 
rather than unwanted intrusion.  
This representation well illustrated by the article “European deputies stood up for the 
Russian” (KO, 2012, September 14). It is mainly dedicated to the description of the 
critical resolution adopted by the European parliament and to denouncing some of the 
recent legal cases, including the Pussy Riot case, and to unseating the opposition deputy 
of the State Duma, Gennady Gudkov. In the article, Europe is portrayed not as an 
impartial judge, but as a “big brother” that is caring and strict. The following statement 
clearly illustrates my point: “The authors of the resolution are convinced that their 
pressure may cause positive changes in Russia.” To a certain extent, the representation 
is similar to “the intrusion” representation because the analyzed Kommersant article 
stresses the fact that the European parliament tries to influence Russian politics (e.g. 
“Brussels is convinced that the pressure on Russia can be effective”) and quotes one of 
the authors of the resolution as saying: “Apart from the emotional reaction of the 
Russian diplomats and politicians, we sometimes also see concrete return steps from 
their side.” What distinguishes this article from the articles that are subsumed within 
“the intrusion” representation is that it seems to simply accept that the European efforts 
are natural without actually qualifying this position. The journalist is not concerned 
about whether there is actual pressure or not or whether the external pressure is a 
negative or positive thing, rather he is just concerned with its effectiveness. 
Therein, it is worth considering the structure of the article. The official opinion is 
expressed in one paragraph situated towards the end. It is significant to mention that the 
journalist chooses very radical statements for illustrating an official position. The head 
of the international affairs committee of the State Duma, Aleksey Pushkov, is quoted in 
the article saying: “The European parliament looks like a parasite that wants to leech to 
the protest movement that expresses the wishes of a part of the Russian society…” 
(“European deputies stood up for the Russian”, 2012, September 14). According to 
Pushkov, the authors of the resolution “proceed from the wrong premises that they can 
always put forward their terms to Moscow, and the development of the relations with 
them is an award for fulfilling these terms.” It would probably be not incorrect to 
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conclude that the description of the Russian official position in Kommersant may be 
somehow associated with a description of a “naughty child” who does not follow the 
obvious and rational decision making path. For example, in Pushkov’s statements: “The 
Russian authorities assert that the most appropriate response to Strasbourg’s statement 
is to fully ignore it” (“European deputies stood up for the Russian”, KO, 2012, 
September 14). It is evident that the article combines two representations of relations: 
Europe as a mentor and Europe as an intruder, as it is articulated by Pushkov. 
A similar representation emerges in the Kommersant articles “Russia was failed on the 
European session” (KO, 2012, October 3) and “Russia is passing a hard session” (KO, 
2012, October 2). Both headings metaphorically refer to Russia as a student who has 
failed an exam: in Russian the word “session” («сессия») also means a series of 
examinations after every school semester. The representation is also advanced by the 
author of the document Andreas Gross, quoted in the article “Russia was failed on the 
European session” (KO, 2012, October 3), who says that “such documents do not 
change anything by themselves. They are like a doctor’s diagnosis and prescription. It is 
in the interests of Russia to take recommendation into account.” 
The article "Segey Naryshkin disposed of PACE's amendments" (KO, 2012, September 
28) sheds light on the origin of that image: “Now, in the context of the hard economic 
situation in Europe and its loss of considerable leverages on the world scene, Moscow 
perceives in a haughty manner all the complaints from the PACE.” It means that 
Russian authorities “do not want or are not going to undertake any significant efforts to 
change the attitudes in Strasbourg because of some considerations based upon 
principles.” It is possible to interpret this idea as meaning that perhaps Russia felt that 
Europe was not as strong economically now as it had been before and did not have as 
many tools to repress Russia’s political activities. 
The “Europe as a teacher” representaions can be not only critical and perceived as 
preaching, as we have seen in the examples above, but also inspiring and motivating. In 
an interview with a famous director, Kirill Serebrennikov, a journalist assumes that as 
Russia attracts a lot of attention today, this attention should positively influence the 
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awareness of the Russian movie industry abroad (”What we are doing is an attempt to 
put oneself right”, KO, 2012, August 30). The director answers:  
The attention is attracted, but what kind of attention! Stupid statements of the 
Russian government are the worst regime for the Russian cinema. We are all the 
hostages of the Pussy Riot process. No movie promoters, no cultural events can 
improve the image of Russia, if there is not justice in the country, just 
corruption, hatred and obscurantism. All that we do in cinema are the patriotic 
attempts to show that we are not so wild and horrible as it seems. We are 
Europeans, we can consider a human-being, love, and have read “Faust”…. It is 
an attempt to apologize for what is going on in the country. 
It means that for a certain category of Russian people, Europe looks like a moral 
standard that Russia should aspire to reach.  
By the same token, we can analyze the article "Gudkov calls upon his colleague in the 
Duma not to disgrace in front of Europe" (IZ, 2012, September 5). The opposition 
politician Gennady Gudkov says that “If Russia does not want to disgrace itself in 
Europe, if it wants to be involved in the European integration; it has to behave as a 
normal and adequate partner.” Moreover, he says that he is going to meet the head of 
the European Parliament to discuss the situation in Russia. Obviously, the pursuit of 
European integration is a natural desire for opposition politicians like Gudkov who 
share pro-Western views because Europe serves as an example of how a democracy 
should function and develop. The most striking thing about this article is that it was 
published in the pro-government Izvestia. The article consists almost solely of different 
statements by Gudkov, with very few journalistic comments. I should point out that the 
way this image is built into the overall Izvestia discourse may turn it into an example of 
“the intrusion” representation for the Izvestia readers. Gudkov’s attempts to appeal to 
Europe and involve it as a judge may be seen by them as a confirmation that Russian 
liberal politicians are in collision with European politicians, while Europe with their 
help tries to intrude into Russian domestic politics. This is another illustration of how 
the representation of Europe as a mentor works as the other side of the representation of 
Europe as an intruder. 
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4.3.2. Europe as a savior 
The representation of Europe as a savior is similar in many ways to the representation of 
Europe as a mentor. However, if the former mainly infers that Russia should learn and 
adopt European values and democratic standards, then the latter ascribes a greater role 
in Russian development to Europe. This corresponds with the beliefs of the pro-Western 
part of society who believe that the West could and should play a more substantial role 
in making Putin’s regime more democratic. Let us look at some examples. 
The first article to consider is “PACE and Russia get closer with seven-league strides” 
(KO, 2012, September 6). As opposed to the aforementioned discussion on the 
representations of the “double standards” that Europe applies to Russia, this article 
articulates the idea that PACE treats the Russian government too gently. First of all, its 
author rigorously analyses all the critical suggestions that PACE makes for Russia and 
covers each one in detail. (It is interesting to have a look at how this approach is 
different from the approach used by the author of the Izvestia interview “I can come to 
Moscow to meet Naryshkin” (IZ, 2012, September 2). She refers to the PACE 
recommendations in a highly informal and direct manner:  “Duh! Here is the 
requirement to revise the verdict to Pussy Riot, to stop breaking up demonstrations…”) 
The close attention to the PACE requirements indicates the value and importance that 
the Kommersant authors attach to them. Again, it directly contradicts to the multiple 
articles from Izvestia where the requirements of PACE were portrayed as unfounded. 
Secondly, while reading the article, it becomes self-evident that the Kommersant 
authors look at the resolution and at the situation in Russia with European values in 
mind and as such they take into consideration “the functioning of the ‘pluralistic 
democracy’, supremacy of law as well of human rights and basic liberties” (“PACE and 
Russia get closer with seven-league strides”, KO, 2012, September 6). 
In order to uncover the specific aspects of the representation that the article frames, I 
will describe the structure. As it has already been said, firstly, the article provides us 
with the opinions of the European officials: “The speakers are confirmed that the 
upcoming months will play decisive role in a democratic future of Russia” (“PACE and 
Russia get closer with seven-league strides”, KO, 2012, September 6). Secondly, it 
66 
 
mentions the position of Russian officials in one (!) passage saying that a vice-speaker 
of PACE Leonid Slutsky, representing the Russian delegation during the discussion of 
the report by the Monitoring committee, “was content with the project of the resolution 
having called it ‘balanced and critical within reasonable limits’”.  
For the representation we analyze, it is more important to pay attention to the end of the 
article where opposition politicians, including Vladimir Ryzhkov who called the 
resolution “week and even cowardly”, are quoted (“PACE and Russia get closer with 
seven-league strides”, KO, 2012, September 6). Ryzhkov continues by saying that “the 
tone of the resolution does not reflect the situation in our country” because “according 
to his words, Russia de facto does not meet the European conventions at all: ‘the 
Monitoring committee should have given strict time constrains to comply with the 
requirement. Instead of it, they got away with the general phrases’”. We can conclude 
that one of the main points of the text is to rebuke Europe for its inadequate and 
insufficient evaluation of the Russian government. It means that at least a part of 
Russian society believes that Europe may be or actually is able to influence the Russian 
government. Moreover, there are people who actually expect Europe to take certain 
tangible measures apart from just expressing its disappointment.  
The article “The Pussy Riot list” (VE, 2012, September 11) has a very similar structure 
to the previously analyzed article from Kommersant. It extensively refers to the 
representatives of the European parliament. Then, it briefly mentions the Russian 
official position without providing a direct quotation. Then, the authors provide several 
quotes from the Pussy Riot lawyer Mark Feygin, who hopes that “the new resolution 
will urge the Russian judicial authorities to adopt a legitimate and humane decision” 
with regards to Pussy Riot case. 
This representation of Europe as an anticipated savior is even more clear in an opinion 
article written by Alexander Yanov, a historian from the City University of New York, 
called “Notes of historian: To remember history and not to lose hope” (Yanov, VE, 
2012, September 7). Yanov feels that Europe plays a fundamental role in establishing 
Russian democracy and working towards transforming Putin’s regime. He attaches 
tremendous importance to the “protests of the European public against “the witch 
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trials’” in the 21-century Moscow.” The situation in Russia today reminds him of the 
Soviet Union of the 1970 and the Pussy Riot case reminds him of the dissidents’ trials 
in the 1970s. Yanov asserts that the split of the Russian elite under the threat from the 
West was one of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union: 
The USSR decayed and the smell of rot … turned out to be unbearable for the 
[European] public… The same thing happens now with Putin’s regime. It is 
decaying. The Pussy Riot case as a distinct symptom of degeneration roused the 
[European] public. (Yanov, VE, 2012, September 7). 
The author believes that “the initial (but critical, able to split the elite of the regime) 
shove should come from outside [of Russia]”. “The shove” from Europe does not imply 
anything “dramatic”, but just “a financial investigation”, namely an attempt to find 
Putin’s assets. It would split the Russian elite and thus give the Russian opposition a 
chance at power.  
I suppose that the representation of Europe as a savior might be crucial for the Russian 
liberal press. This image resonates with the hopes of the pro-Western Russians who 
inherently believe that at some point - after another disputable legal case or a human 
rights violation - Europe will no longer be able to deal with Putin’s authoritarian 
regime. However, the regime will not be able to survive solely, as for example Belarus 
does, due to the dependence on the economic connections with Europe. Thus, the only 
option it will have is to become more democratic. Hence, the more attention that the 
human rights violations gets in Europe, the more probable it is that the Russian 
government will react to it. This might be one of the reasons for such a detailed 
description of the European reaction and Russia’s demonstrative disregard towards it.  
 
4.4. Marginal representations of Russian-European relations  
In the course if the analysis, it was possible to detect two more representations of 
Russian-European relations, namely “Europe as an economic partner” and “Russia as an 
integral part of Europe”. Because these representations are not quite wide-spread, I am 
reluctant to include them under the government/liberal or official/unofficial categories. I 
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can only mention that they seem to be more common in the liberal press than in the pro-
government press. However, it might be connected with the fact that the liberal press is 
more prone to presenting versatile representations than to sticking to a particular one. 
Anyway, as the goal of my study is to explore the representations rather than organize 
them into categories, the following sub-chapter presents the linguistic and intertextual 
analysis of these final two representations. 
 
4.4.1 Europe as an economic partner 
First, I would like to address the representation of Europe as an economic partner. This 
representation portrays Russian-European relations as if they were based solely on the 
mutual economic advantages. This representation implies that the relations should be 
free of any political or ideological elements and be founded upon mutual economic 
benefit. Though this representation is quite rare compared to the others, it is worth 
examining it due to the fact that it is important to the political discourse of Putin and 
Medvedev, which will be elaborated upon in the discussion chapter.  
An example of this image can be found in the article “Strasbourg is detrimental to 
Naryshkin" (VE, 2012, September 27). The article discusses Naryshkin’s denial to 
participate in the PACE session and looks at the different strategies behind his 
participation. The main idea of the article is the fact that Russia is presented as an equal 
partner of Europe. The specific aspects of this idea can be summarized as follows: 
though the resolution is extremely negative and PACE might be biased, Russia has to 
behave rationally. Russia had taken some responsibilities, but it also should not support 
an “unbridled and reactionary attitude.” Russia has to work with Europe as long as it is 
beneficial because failure to cooperate may in particular hurt its image. 
The second article written is called “In the shade of Syria” (VE, 2012, August 2). It 
analyzes the visit of Vladimir Putin to Great Britain. This was his first visit in seven 
years. The main idea of the article is that relations between the two countries are 
developing despite all of the political disagreements, including the disagreement with 
the results of the Pussy Riot case.  
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To conclude this sub-chapter, I want to provide a quotation from article "Farewell to the 
pan-European home" (Rahr, IZ, 2012, August 16). This article sheds light on the 
emergence of the "Europe as an economic partner” representation and its implications. 
The article states: “Russia was interested in the particular projects and in the dialogue 
with Germany on the European security… Berlin from the very beginning perceives the 
dialogue as a forum for communication between the established German civil society 
and the incipient Russian.” In accordance with this statement, we may think that the 
difficulties of European-Russian relations are tied to the fact that the Russian authorities 
see Europe purely as an economic partner and do not understand how Russian domestic 
politics can spoil its relationship with Europe. This causes difficulties and 
misunderstanding, “but it always seems for Russians that the criticism from the West is 
connected to the too primitive understanding of Russian reality, with the ‘double-
standards’ policies or with a certain ‘order’” (IZ, 2012, August 16).  On the other hand, 
the moral standards of European society do not let it maintain relations with a regime 
that is not fully democratic without attempting to reinforce democratic values. 
 
4.4.2. Russia as a part of the Western world 
Finally, I have retrieved several examples from the articles that try to depict Russia as a 
valid member of the West. In the article “Punk-prayer and the responsibility of the 
government: Government should be a shock absorber” (Lukjanov, VE, 2012, August 
17) the author Fedor Lukjanov also concentrates on the clash of civilizations. The 
peculiar feature lies in the fact that this is not a collision between Europe and Russia, 
but rather between two other trends: on the one hand, the global community and 
globalization are themselves washing away traditional views, norms and rules, and, on 
the other hand, the rise of traditionalism turns into a “destructive obscurantism.” Thus, 
the author describes the world, including Europe and Russia, as being filled with 
struggle between liberalism and traditionalism. What is important here is that Russia is 
placed on the same level as the USA and Europe.  
Another perspective on Russia as a part of Europe is presented in the article "To 
remember history and not to lose hope: It will take a long time” (Inozemtsev, VE, 2012, 
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September 10). The article defies the idea articulated by the political scholar Yanov that 
the relations between the West and Russia are now similar to those of the Cold war 
period, or even of the 17th century, when Europe was a direct threat to the Russian 
statehood. According to the author, due to the fact that Russia is no longer a world 
super-power, Russian-European relations are limited to, one the one hand, the West 
using “milliards of dollars [of the Russian elite] parked in its banks” and, on the other 
hand, to Western intellectuals being concerned with the oppressed position of some 
social categories in Russia. In other words, with the Russian position in the world being 
so weak, one cannot speak about any serious possibility of any conflict between Russia 
and the West. Moreover, the author believes that the rising youth in Russia, which “has 
never breathed air of unfreedom” and has not lived in the Soviet Union, already knows 
“if not the European values, than at least the European way of life” (Inozemtsev, VE, 
2012, September 10). Thus, these youths will sooner or later take power in the country 
and as such, the author believes that the European norms and beliefs will become 
dominant in Russia politics. 
A similar idea can be found in the article “Pussy Riot, clash of civilizations, and 
revolution” (Rahr, IZ, 2012, August 8): 
…one third [of the Russian population] is an educated middle class that has the 
same perception of the Pussy Riot case as the West has. These people want to 
live like people do in Europe; Russia with its ‘peculiar world-view’ is alien to 
them. The number of ‘the educated westernizers’ is growing by leaps and 
bounds, and they will constitute the majority of Russians of the next generation.  
Thus, this article may be seen as a combination of “the collision” and “the integration” 
representations. 
I also have to mention that the representation of Russia as a part of Europe seems to be 
present in the press primarily as the opinion of certain politicians or scholars and not as 
an integral element of the pro--government or liberal discourses. Nevertheless, the 
“integration” representation in general is not found in the Russian press very often and  
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4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have retrieved and carried out critical discourse analysis of the 
representations of European-Russian relations from four Russian newspapers. I have 
primarily analyzed these representations on the intertextual level, but I have also applied 
some elements of linguistic analysis when it was necessary and relevant.   
Thus, I have revealed that Russian-European relations are most commonly portrayed as 
a religious, civilizational or political collision especially if we consider the pro-
government newspapers Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta. These representations are 
often underpinned by the belief that the West conducts a war against Russia and has 
some secret agenda against it.  
The liberal press is more likely to portray Europe as a teacher or a moral and political 
standard that the Russian government has to strive to achieve. In some articles this 
representation seems to develop into the representation of Europe as savior. The 
adherents of this representation believe that Europe should have more influence on 
Russian politics and that European politicians have to undertake some tangible steps to 
make the Russian government more democratic.  
Finally, it was possible to detect some peripheral representations, namely “Europe as an 
economic partner” and “Russia as an integral part of Europe” that are not easily as 
elements of the pro-government or liberal discourses. Quite often they are based on the 
personal opinions and beliefs of particular experts and politicians. 
In the next chapter, I will summarize and combine some of the main findings of the 
literature review and the intertextual analysis. The result will constitute the macro-
sociological part of the critical discourse analysis.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part tries to connect the results from the 
data analysis to a broader socio-political context. The second part forms a bridge 
between the concepts discussed in the literature review and my own findings. Third, I 
address some of the methodological limitations and difficulties that I have faced while 
conducting the analysis and also present some suggestions for further research. The last 
two parts of this chapter delineate the main contributions of the project and give some 
final notes on the topic. 
At the beginning, I want to underscore that in the course of the data analysis it was 
possible to answer the research question of how relations between Europe and Russia 
are represented in the articles covering the Pussy Riot case in the context of Russian 
political culture and the discourses of different Russian political forces. As a result, I 
conclude that the main purpose of the study, which is to explore the representations of 
Russian-European relations in Russian media, has been successfully achieved.  
Thus, relations between Russia and Europe have a variety of different representations in 
the Russian press: political, cultural, and religious collision, Europe as a mentor, Europe 
as a savior, Europe as an economic partner, Russia as in integral part of Europe. The 
first one generally corresponds with the official discourse and is more widely employed 
by the pro-government publications Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta. The second and 
the third seem to be more relevant for the liberal press. The latter ones do not form a 
distinctive picture and are associated with the opinions of particular scholars and 
politicians. One may be tempted to say that the last two representations, while not 
constituting a solid image, might have been omitted. However, I believe that since the 
purpose of my study was to demonstrate the variety of representations in its fullness and 
richness, those representations have to be included as well. 
 
5.1 Retrieved representation in the context of Russian politics 
The main method of the analysis applied in this study is CDA as it is described by 
Norman Fairclough (1995). A constitutive component of this method, apart from the 
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intertextual and linguistic parts, is the exploration of relations between texts and a 
socio-cultural context. Moreover, in the literature review, I have shown that a media 
discourse is influenced by the discourses of political forces and the national political 
culture. That is why the following two sub-chapters are devoted to the descriptions of 
how the retrieved representations are connected to and interact with both the pro-
government and liberal political discourses. The connections between these 
representations and Russian political culture are explained in section 5.2. 
 
5.1.1 Russian-European relations within the framework of the pro-government 
discourse 
As it has been found, the core representation of Russian-European relations is the so 
called cultural, political, and religious collision and its variations. It implies that Russia 
is structurally, mentally, and culturally different from Europe and even in some way 
superior to it. If we refer to Modigliani (1989), who says that some media discourse 
may be more potent than others because they resonate with the views and beliefs that 
already exist in society or with the traditions and myths of a certain culture in general, 
we may consider the “collision” representation as the most potent one because it is 
mainly articulated by the dominant forces in Russian politics. Thus, the representation 
finds support in many official doctrines, for example, in the “Concept of the foreign 
policy of the Russian Federation” written in 2008 published on the official web-site of 
the Russian President (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 15). .  
For instance, firstly, the Concept (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 15) sates that one of the 
main goals of Russian foreign policy is:  
to ensure security of the country, maintaining and reinforcing its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, stable and authoritative positions in the world 
community, equitable as much as possible to its [Russia’s] interest as one of the 
most influential centers of the modern world and necessary for the growth of its 
political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential… 
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From this statement and throughout the whole document, it is possible to conclude that 
there is thought to be a certain threat to the Russian security, sovereignty, and integrity 
We can assume that this idea underpins the representation of Europe as an intruder who 
wants to impose its interests and values on Russia.  
Secondly, the same concept puts emphasis on acting in accordance with international 
regulations and legislation: thus Russia criticizes “…the disregard by certain states and 
groups of states of the main principles of the international law. Russia demands that the 
generally recognized norms of the international legislation should be totally universal in 
terms of their understanding and application” (Prezident Rosii, 2008, July 15).  This is 
just one of many references to the importance of the international legislation in 
maintaining healthy relations between countries. This is an important point to consider 
with regards to the representation of the “double-standard” policy representation in the 
press. I have tried to demonstrate how some articles articulate the idea that Europe 
sometimes changes their interpretation of their internal standards as well as international 
legislation depending on what country it deals with and what interests it pursues in a 
country. As a result, according to the “double-standards” representation, it has an 
opportunity and a motivation to apply higher standards to Russia. 
Thirdly, the Concept (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 15) mentions that  
The importance of religious factor in formation of modern international relation 
is growing and in particular the importance of its moral foundations. This task 
cannot be solved without addressing to a common moral denominator that has 
always been present in major world religious.  
The emphasis on religious morality here corresponds with the representation of the 
moral and religious collision between Europe and Russia and the belief in Russian 
moral superiority that can be found in some publications.  
Finally, the Concept does not seem to contain any direct references to a “media war” or 
“conspiracy” against Russia. But it has some points that may be interpreted as the basis 
for this idea: 
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The response of the historic West to the perspective of losing its monopoly over 
globalizing processes is expressed in particular in the inertia of the political and 
psychological guidelines of “deterring” Russia, including the attempts of using 
for these purposes a ‘selective history’ approach… (Prezident Rossii, 2008, July 
15). 
Thus, the concept of “deterring” Russia in the official discourse could be transformed 
into belief by the general population, or vice versa, in a media war.  
To sum it up, the representation of “collision” is intrinsically tied and, probably, finds it 
origin in the official governmental discourse and doctrines. This may be one of the 
reasons for the current situation in the country, where “only about a third [of the 
population] saw Europe as a partner with whom a long-term relationship could be 
developed and enhanced. Furthermore, while almost half (45 per cent) considered 
Europe as a potential threat to Russia” (Bova, 2010, 30). 
 
5.1.2 Russian-European relations within the framework of the liberal discourse 
On the other hand, the representations of Europe as a mentor and as a savior seem to 
meet the demands of the liberal and pro-Western part of society because they are more 
widely used in the liberal Kommersant and Vedomosti. Many of their readers believe 
that Russia nowadays has diverged from the true European path. A common view 
among them is that there is no such a thing as a special “Russian way” (Engelbrekt, 
Nygren, 2010a, 7, Nygren, 2010, 55), which was explored in the literature review.   
Those representations are also associated with the liberal approach towards international 
relations (IR) in the Russian academic discourse. Actually, liberalism in IR is a versatile 
movement, but due to the lack of space I cannot go deep into the specific details of its 
different aspects and that is why I will limit myself only to mentioning just the most 
general principles. Tsygankov (2003/2004) claims that liberalism was the dominant 
approach to IR in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but then was 
set aside. Thus, Tsygankov (2003/2004) says that liberalism in international relations 
implies that: 
76 
 
in a rapidly changing context of international relation, the main goal of a state’s 
foreign policy is not asserting its own interests, but co-operation for the sake of 
the triumph of universal values, with such values as human rights and freedoms, 
market community, and pluralistic democracy being the main ones. 
In accordance with his article “Liberalism in the Russian international relations theory”, 
Russian liberals considered the collapse of the USSR to be a historic chance for Russia 
to become a flourishing country if it could stop “the established stereotypes” and, first 
of all, “the suspiciousness towards the West and traditional Russian ‘great-power 
policy’” (Tsygankov, 2003/2004).  
Hence, I suggest that while the liberal approach lost its dominant position when Putin 
came into power, it has not absolutely disappeared and it still remains topical for a 
certain part of Russian society. This can be confirmed by the presence of the 
representations of Europe as a mentor and Europe as a savior in the Russian press. It 
seems that Europe as a teacher is a direct echo of the official course of the Russian 
foreign policy of the 1990s when the gap between Russian and European political 
cultures was narrowing (Bova, 2010). As a result, this representation still puts emphasis 
on learning from the Western practices.  
I assume that the representation of Europe as a savoir is a newer one and belongs to the 
liberal discourse of the 2000s because it seems to carry a particular meaning of seeking 
Europe’s help in order to transform the current political situation in Russia. At the same 
time, in the 1990s, pro-Western liberals were the dominant political power and 
president Yeltsin himself declared that Russia was ready to integrate in Europe (Smith, 
1999). As the liberals were the hegemonic force (contested only by the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federations), they had all the tools to transform the regime 
themselves in case it was necessary and did not need any savior. However, after they 
had lost the hegemonic position, which was eventually occupied by the “United 
Russia”, they had to call upon Europe to help them return the hegemony. 
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5.2 Social and political implications of the revealed representations  
What I have been trying to accomplish by providing extensive quotations from official 
and academic sources is to demonstrate that the retrieved representations originate not 
in the press itself but are deeply rooted in the foundation of the Russian nation. As a 
result, we have proof that the hegemonic representations of the collision are intrinsically 
tied to the discourse of “United Russia” and the top-officials. At the same time, it goes 
without saying that the liberal representations are bound to the discourse of liberal 
forces. 
At this point, it is worth referring to the discussion about Russian political culture by 
highlighting Bova’s (2010, 24) list of its main attributes: personalized authorities, 
statism, sobornost’, order, and unity of church and state. Most of them resonate, to a 
certain extent and perhaps even directly with the representations of the 
cultural/religious/political clash and official discourse in general. One of the most 
potent examples is the connection between statism and the representation of Europe as 
an intruder. As Russians are preoccupied with the idea of a strong state (Petrova, 2003, 
Novembers 13; Smith, 1999; Bova, 2010), which is capable not only of protecting itself, 
but also of having an impact on the world, it seems natural that they are repulsed by the 
fact that Europe tries to implant its own rules upon Russia, despite that fact that Europe 
may have good intentions in mind. Thus, statism implies that any kind of influence will 
be regarded by the majority of the population as superfluous. In this context, it is also 
easy to explain the belief in “a media war” and the concept of the media being a 
powerful mechanism of European influence. 
Another attribute that cannot be omitted here is the unity of the Orthodox Church and 
state. It clearly shapes the basis for the “religious clash” representation. As I have 
described, this representation has multiple variations, but the core of all of them is the 
fact that most Russians tend to attach much more importance to the role of Church and 
religion in a country than Europeans (Bova, 2010, 24-25, Legvold, 2007, 109). 
Moreover, these representations give the impression that religion not considered by the 
people to be connected to personal beliefs and values, but rather is important in in the 
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context of the nation and state. As a result, any possible outrage against the Church is 
seen as an outrage against the state. This in turn takes us back to the notion of statism. 
To sum up this point, one could definitely find more correlations between the official 
representations and the attributes of the political culture described by Bova (2010): 
“religious collision” can be also connected with sobornost’, “double-standards” with the 
desire for order and the desire to make everyone follow the same rules. What should 
also be highlighted here is that these are the official representations that correspond with 
the Russian political culture, while the liberal representations generally contradict it. It 
is probably one of the factors that make official representations hegemonic. 
The second conclusion is that the retrieved representations show the presence of a 
strong opposition between two parts of Russian society. It is easy to see that generally 
the analyzed press maintain the separation between “Slavophiles”, for whom Russia is 
“marked to lead a grand Slavic civilization” (Legvold, 2007, 110), and “Westernizers”, 
who believe that “Russia’s path to progress requires that Russia acknowledges its 
cultural affinity with Europe and dedicate itself to emulating Europe’s values and 
institutions” (Legvold, 2007, 108). The representation of “collision” directly reflects 
“Slavophiles’” worldview, while the liberal representations can be associated with the 
“Westernizer’” discourse.  
The contradiction between government and liberal discourses is reinforced by several 
“inverse” representations: “Europe as an intruder”, used primarily in the pro-
government press, is opposed to the idea of “Europe as a mentor” that is presented in 
the liberal press. Similarly, the belief in a “media war” is opposed to “Europe as a 
savior”. The representation of Russia as an integral part of Europe can be seen as the 
opposite side of the “collision” representation in general. The demand for the “inverse” 
representations confirm that society is clearly divided into two, though not equal, parts. 
The most distinctive example is that the similar statements of scholars/politicians may 
serve to illustrate different representations and obviously are interpreted in different 
ways by different social groups.  
Thirdly, at such, it is crucial to underline a certain contradiction between the extent to 
which liberal representations are used in the press and the fact that the adherents of the 
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liberal discourse are not represented in the State Duma. By this I mean that the liberal 
representations of Russian-European relations constitute a substantial element of the 
analyzed media texts. Here, I have to refer to the idea discussed in the literature review 
that media discourses have to resonate with the worldview and perceptions of audiences 
(Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). It implies that a certain part of Russian society has a 
demand for a liberal discourse because they share liberal values. At the same time, no 
party in the Duma articulates any kind of discourse that would correlate with their 
values. As it has been mentioned in the first chapter, liberal views are expressed 
primarily by the representative of the non-system opposition, which have little access to 
the official policy-making (see Golosov, 2011, September 1, Trenin, 2012, March 2, 
Nichol, 2013, April 16). This asymmetry may only indicate significant disproportions 
that exist in Russian society. Moreover, this pertains not only to the relations with 
Europe, but to some other elements of social, economic, and political life. In brief, a 
substantial part of Russian society wants liberal political discourse (not only in 
international relations, but in other spheres as well) that is not satisfied by the parties 
represented in the Duma. 
The most distinctive example of the broader social consequences of the above 
mentioned disproportions is the strengthening of a protest movement in Russia in 2011-
2013. By a protest movement I mean a series of political demonstrations that began 
after the State Duma elections December 4, 2011, and are periodically organized up till 
now. The movement has clear anti-government and and-Putin orientation. One of the 
first demonstrations, on the Bolotnaya Square, turned out to be the most mass 
demonstration of the last decade (Volkov, 2012). The participants of the demonstrations 
consist primarily out of well-educated and affluent people from the largest cities. 
(Golosov, 2011, September 1, Volkov, 2012). Volkov (2012, 5) explains this by 
mentioning that while the majority of the Russia people are severely limited in material 
resources and are used to adapting to any political conditions, the more affluent 
minority have much higher demands, but they are almost totally bereft of political 
influence. It is not surprising that, according to the results of the research conducted by 
Volkov (2012, 22), most of the participants of the demonstrations describe themselves 
as “liberals” and “democrats”. As a result, this affluent minority tries to defend its rights 
80 
 
by actively participating in protests. Thus, one of the causes of the strengthening of the 
movement is the fact the political views of affluent liberal Russians are not represented 
in official politics. This confirms my idea that a part of the Russian society expresses 
demands for liberal political discourse not only in foreign affairs issues, but in other 
spheres as well. The fact that those demands are not satisfied by the parties represented 
in the Duma causes unrest in society.  
With regards to the third conclusion, I also argue that the liberal discourse has a strong 
potential to substantially challenge the hegemonic discourse. It seems relevant here to 
briefly revisit some of the aspects of media discourse theory discussed in the literature 
review. The first one is Hall’s (1993, 96) idea that “reality exists outside language but it 
is constantly mediated by and through language; and what we can know and say has to 
be produced through discourse”. The second one is that discourse is not reduced to 
conveying pre-existent meanings, but rather plays an important role in constructing 
those meanings as well. All of these let me conclude that if a certain type of discourse is 
constantly conveyed to people - such as, for example, the representations of Europe as a 
savior - sooner or later it may become capable of constructing reality and influencing 
the worldviews and perceptions of more and more people. Regardless, this does not 
mean the liberal representations are now close to becoming hegemonic ones, but only 
that politicians and diplomats, especially in Russia, have to take into account that the 
liberal representations are quite wide-spread in the media, but are not represented in the 
official political spectrum. 
Fourth, as it has been mentioned several times, while the representations of Russia as an 
integral part of Europe and Europe as an economic partner are not clearly reflected in 
the analyzed press, it is necessary to mention that they seem to have a small and 
undefined place in both the liberal and pro-government discourses. The origin of these 
representations are more or less clear with regards to the liberal discourse as they have 
clear a “Westernizer”’ implications (Engelbrekt, and Nygren, 2010a, Legvold, 2007). 
However, these representations might also be regarded as an echo of Putin’s discourse 
of the beginning of the 2000s when the formal Russian foreign policy was clearly 
bilateral. Let me recollect here Colton’s and Hale’s (2009) thought that at that point, 
Putin’s rhetoric made it clear that Russia saw itself a as member of the Western 
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community, sharing common European views and values. While at the same time, Putin 
always expressed discontent with the Western internal and international policies.  Thus, 
these representations might be seen as an echo of the pro-Western part of the official 
discourse. 
Finally, an additional result is that the representations are deployed unevenly by the 
different newspapers. A reader of Izvestia and Rossiyskaya gazeta seems to acquire a 
much more unified image of Russia-European relations and is not presented with 
alternative views because the articles rely primarily on the official government 
discourse. Moreover, the opinions of the Russian opposition and European politicians 
are either not mentioned at all or mentioned in an ironic manner. At the same time 
though, the liberal press also uses a more or less established set of representations, but it 
does try to examine government opinions and thus conveys a more diversified picture.  
Indeed, this conclusion is supported by the ambiguous position of the Russian press that 
I have discussed before. Let me here recollect once again Lipman’s article (2010) 
“Rethinking Russia: Freedom of Expression without Freedom of the Press”. Even the 
name of the article implicates how contradictory the position of Russian media is. One 
the one hand, the press is rated as “not free” by the Freedom House (Freedom House). 
Consequently, the most influential media outlets, including newspapers, are by different 
means controlled by the government and thus produce discourses, which are consistent 
with the government point of view. This is, obviously, one of the reasons why the 
representation of collision between Russia and Europe that is associated with the 
Kremlin discourse is a dominant one.  
On the other hand, lack of freedom of press does not automatically induce lack of 
freedom of expression. It is confirmed by the fact that some media conduct brilliant 
journalistic investigations and one can acquire different information and opinions, 
which are inconsistent with the government’s ones, for example from the Internet and 
relatively small media (Lipman, 2010, 156). Lipman (2010, 155-156) writes that this 
group of media is collectively described as liberal and they even dare publish “reports of 
governmental corruption and mismanagement”. In my research, this situation is upheld 
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by the presence of a more versatile set of representations in relatively small liberal 
Vedomosti and Kommersant. 
 
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The main methodological obstacle that I have faced while conducting the research is 
that the representations are generally intertwined. When an author refers to many 
different information sources, each of whom has his/her own perception of Russia-
European relations, it might be very difficult to determine what picture an author 
himself wants to convey and what representation is a the prevailing one. In order to 
overcome this difficulty, I apply structural and linguistic analyses of texts. As a rule, the 
place in an article where a journalist refers to a source, how much space is given to a 
reference, and how this reference is framed may cast some light on what representation 
a journalist has in mind. That is also one of the reasons why I pay so much attention on 
the structures of some articles. Besides, when an article contains several representations 
that are equally important, quite often with regards to the interviews, I subsume it under 
all the relevant categories. 
Nevertheless, I believe that some future research should be conducted in order to 
understand more thoroughly the connections between discourses from different news 
sources, such as experts and politicians, and the discourses of journalists. It seems 
relevant to study how a journalist frames the statements of his news sources, for 
example, by looking at how different publications apply and frame opinions of the same 
expert or official. It would provide us with a better understanding of the role and level 
of objectivity of the Russian mass media in portraying a particular issue, shaping the 
perceptions of their readers and exploiting specific linguistic tools. Besides, despite the 
fact there have been done a variety of research that theoretically examine the 
connections between media and political discourses (e.g. Nikitina, 2006; Zinoviev, 
2003), it seem that there is a lack of research analyzing the connections and 
interrelations of those discourse in Russia from a more practical perspective, which 
would concentrate on concrete and clear examples from modern politics. 
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Also, additional research has to be conducted in order to examine the origin and 
implications of the representations of Europe as an economic partner and Russia as an 
integral part of Europe. Though they are not quite typical for the four analyzed 
newspapers, they may be essential for some other types of media. Further analysis of 
these representations would also contribute to the understanding of how Russian-
European relations are portrayed in the Russian media. 
 
5.4 Contribution 
My research has been carried out at the crossroads of communication studies and 
international relations and thus contributes to the both fields. Moreover, I believe that 
some of the results might have some significance for foreign affairs practitioners and 
politicians who are engaged in Russian-European relations.  
There have been a variety of studies which analyze relations between Russia and 
Europe as well as the approaches and attitudes of different political forces in the context 
of these relations (e.g. Legvold, 2007, Smith, 1999). As an example, I want to mention a 
book “Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches”, edited by Kjell 
Engelbrekt and Bertil Nygren, that comprises the articles covering manifold aspects of 
Russian-European relations: from energy and security issues to some particular aspects 
of norms and values that pertain to those relations. There is also research that examines 
the attitudes towards Europe among the general Russian population (see O'Loughlin et 
al., 2006, O'Loughlin et al., 2005, Petrova, 2003, November 13). Subsequently, my 
research complements these two types of studies by building a bridge between how the 
relations are seen by officials and experts and what picture is conveyed to and formed 
by the Russian population as a whole.  
One of the distinguishing features of this research is a critical discursive perspective that 
gives the reader a chance to see more profound aspects of Russian-European relations. It 
seems self-evident that Russian-European relations are structured not only by the 
government positions stated in official doctrines, but also by the perceptions and 
attitudes of the nation as a whole. In my view, some of these generally accepted views 
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and attitudes in society cannot help but influence the official Russian foreign policy in 
return. Critical discourse analysis of the media coverage has enabled me to detect those 
perceptions and attitudes and touch upon their historical and cultural background. 
 
5.5 Final words 
Let me summarize the key results of the research. First of all, there are several typical 
representations of Russian-European relations in the analyzed Russian newspapers: 
political/cultural/religious collision, Europe as a mentor, Europe as a savior, Europe as 
an economic partner, Russia as in integral part of Europe. The first one originates and is 
tied to the official discourse of the incumbent government and it can be considered to be 
hegemonic. The second and the third representations seem to correlate with the 
discourse of the Russian liberal movement. The last two can be seen as peripheral and 
not clearly represented in the analyzed texts. Further research has to be done in order to 
determine what discourses they belong to. Secondly, the correlation between the 
particular newspapers and representations confirms that Russian society is clearly 
divided into two groups: one part sees Europe as a teacher and the other sees Europe, if 
not as an enemy, then at least as an opponent. Nevertheless, if we take a critical 
discursive perspective here, we will see that the latter part has a clear hegemonic 
position which is contested by marginal discourses. 
I want to conclude by saying that unfortunately during the last decade relations between 
Russia and Europe have not always been friendly and neighbourly. The way they are 
presented in the Russian media explains the nature of some of the contradictions much 
better than official speeches and documents because the foreign affairs politicians who 
formulate them are generally bound by diplomatic courtesies and national interests. The 
media texts I have analyzed are the documents meant for the Russian citizens and thus 
they have much more freedom in interpreting events. This can be seen by how the 
emphasis on acting in accordance with the international laws in the official discourse 
corresponds with the representations of the “double-standard” policies and prejudice 
against Russia in the press. 
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It is also possible to say that many of the aspects causing misunderstanding and 
contradictions seem to be cultural and historical, and are not always based upon any 
objective reasons. The retrieved representations give us evidence of the strong 
importance of such factors as state power, sovereignty, and religion for Russian people. 
It is crucial that the European politicians and scholars realize the significance of these 
cultural and historic factors and take them into consideration when they deal with 
Russia. Otherwise, their good intentions might be interpreted – as happens now - as a 
confirmation of the fact that Europe intrudes into Russian domestic politics or as an 
example of “double-standards”. 
Finally, though the results of the research provide us with a variety of different 
representations, it is worth noting that namely the representation of 
cultural/political/religious collision belongs to the discourse of the pro-Kremlin 
newspapers and most likely takes its origin in the official discourse. It claims that 
“…the Russians’ desire for greater influence, power, and security in the world has not 
diminished” (Suny, 2007, 65) and regardless of what Putin’s government states in the 
official papers and speeches meant for the European audience, it still does not consider 
Europe as a friend.  
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APPENDIX 1: DATA SET 
Kommersant, KO 
’Reloading’ can’t last forever.” (""Перезагрузка" не может продолжаться вечно"), 
(2012, October 3) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2035853  
’What we are doing is an attempt to put oneself right.’ (”’То, что мы делаем,— 
попытка оправдаться’”) (2012, August, 30) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2011192 
European deputies stood up for the Russian. (“Европейские депутаты вступились за 
российского”) (2012, September 14) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: 
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2021619 
PACE and Russia get closer with seven-league strides. (”ПАСЕ и Россия сближаются 
семилетними шагами”) (2012, September 6) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: 
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2016211 
Russia is losing its image. (“Россия выходит из образа”)  (2012, August 8) Retrieved 
2012, October 12 from: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1997276 
Russia is passing a hard session. (“Россия сдает трудную сессию”) (2012, October 02) 
Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2035098 
Russia was failed on the European session. ("Россию завалили на европейской 
сессии") (2012, October 3) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: 
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2035987 
 Sergey Lavrov proves himself as a sport diplomat. (“Сергей Лавров показал себя 
спортивным дипломатом”) (2012, August, 21) Retrieved 2012, October 12 
from: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2005512 
Sergey Naryshkin disposed of PACE's amendments. (“Сергей Нарышкин отклонил 
поправки ПАСЕ”) (2012, September 28) Retrieved 2012, October 12 from: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2031768/print 
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Vedomosti, VE 
In the shade of Syria. (“Под тенью Сирии”) (2012, August 2) Retrieved 2012, October 
13 from: http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/286611/pod_tenyu_sirii 
Notes of a historian: To remember history and not to lose hope. (“Заметки историка: 
Помнить историю и не отчаиваться”) (2012, September 7) Retrieved 2012, 
October 13 from:  
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/306201/pomnit_istoriyu_i_ne_otcha
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APPENDIX 2: DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONS 
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Izvestia "Arkadiy Mamontov: “There is no ordered 
information. These are my views”  
Europe as an intruder, 
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Izvestia "Farewell to the  pan-European home" religious collision, 
Europe as an economic 
partner 
Izvestia "Gudkov calls upon his collogues in the 
Duma not to disgrace themselves in front 
of Europe" 
Europe as a mentor 
Izvestia "Lugovoi accused Berezovskiy of the 
information war against Russia" 
media war  
Izvestia "One can get up to three years in prison for 
religious outrage in Europe" 
double-standarts, 
religious collision 
Izvestia "PACE adopted a toug 
h resolution on Russia” 
Europe as an intruder, 
conspiracy against 
Russia 
Izvestia "PACE is puzzled why Naryshkin 
cancelled the visit" 
Europe as an intruder 
Izvestia "The end of the symphony” religious collision  
Izvestia "The press and Pussy" Europe as an intruder, 
media war 
Izvestia "The verdict to Pussy Riot will be 
announced on August 17th”  
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Izvestia "Uprising without ideal" Europe as an intruder 
Izvestia "Vladimir Putin about Pussy Riot: ‘I do 
not think that the girls should be judged 
that strictly" 
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Izvestia “’For the Brussels, Timoshenko is a tool to 
hold the Ukraine on a distance’”  
Europe as an inturder, 
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